























        vol 5 | 2019
© 2019 The China Studies Program of the Johns Hopkins University  
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 
Publication of SAIS China and the China Studies Program
All rights reserved. 
Design: www.SchumannStudioCreative.com 
Printed on Rolland Hitech - with a minimum of 30% post-consumer fiber,  
made using renewable biogas energy.
The China Studies Program does not take institutional positions on public policy issues;  
the views represented herein are the authors’ own, and do not necessarily  
reflect the views of the Johns Hopkins University staff or trustees.
China Studies Program 
The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School 
of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Rome Building, Suite 606-612 
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
+1 202 663 5816 
chinastudies@jhu.edu
For electronic copies of this report, visit:  
https://saiscsr.org
 i
The SAIS China Studies Review 
is a publication of SAIS China and the 
China Studies Program at the 
Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School 
of Advanced International Studies.
The Review publishes interdisciplinary work 
by graduate students conducting research on 
China, including history, political science, 








THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAISii
About SAIS China
China Studies Review is a publication of SAIS 
China, which encompasses all of the formal 
China-related programs at the Johns Hopkins 
University School of Advanced International 
Studies (SAIS). SAIS China is anchored by the 
China Studies Program at SAIS in Washington, 
D.C., which offers multidisciplinary graduate 
courses on U.S.-China relations, China’s 
foreign policy, domestic politics, security 
issues, leadership, environment, economic 
development, and Taiwan and cross-strait 
relations. Students also complete courses 
related to the wider Asia-Pacific region 
across the school’s more than 20 additional 
areas of study, taught by leading scholars 
and practitioners in their fields.
SAIS students have several options to 
pursue coursework in China. The Hopkins-
Nanjing Center (HNC) in Nanjing began 
operations in 1986 and is the longest-
running partnership between a Chinese 
and American university in China. It is 
jointly administered by Nanjing University 
and Johns Hopkins SAIS. Students have the 
option of one- or two-year courses of study 
in Nanjing, or they can spend one year in 
Nanjing and continue their studies at SAIS 
centers in Washington, D.C. or Bologna, Italy. 
Students must have intermediate to advanced-
level proficiency in Chinese prior to beginning 
study in the certificate or master’s degree 
programs at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center.
The SAIS-Tsinghua Dual Degree Program, 
which began enrolling students in 2015, is 
offered by Johns Hopkins SAIS jointly with 
the International Relations Department at 
Tsinghua University. Students spend one year 
at Tsinghua University in Beijing followed by 
three semesters at SAIS in Washington, D.C. 
With courses taught in English, this program 
offers the opportunity for students to gain 
both a master of arts from Johns Hopkins SAIS 
and a master of law from Tsinghua University.
SAIS China Studies  
Faculty and Associates in Washington, D.C.
Andrew C. Mertha 
George and Sadie Hyman Professor of  
China Studies,  
Director, China Studies and SAIS China
Madelyn Ross  
Associate Director, China Studies 
Executive Director, SAIS China
Carla Freeman 
Associate Research Professor and Executive 
Director, SAIS Foreign Policy Institute
David Bulman 
Assistant Professor
Ling Chen  
Assistant Professor,  
International Political Economy
Ho-Fung Hung 
Professor, Political Economy 
Peter Bottelier  
Affiliated Scholar 
Deborah Brautigam  
Professor, International Political Economy 
Director, China-Africa Research Initiative
David G. Brown  
Affiliated Scholar 
Michael Chase  
Adjunct Professor 
David Keegan 
Adjunct Professor  
Natalie Lichtenstein  
Affiliated Scholar 
Anne F. Thurston 
Adjunct Professor and Director,  
Grassroots China Initiative
Shahid Yusuf  












Naomi Garcia is a second year SAIS M.A. 
candidate with a dual concentration in 
China Studies and Korea Studies. Naomi 
is currently an intern at the National Bureau 
of Asian Research. Prior to SAIS, Naomi 
attended the Hopkins-Nanjing Center 
during which time she was an intern at 
the American Chamber of Commerce in 




Rona Vaselaar is a 2019 SAIS M.A. grad-
uate with a dual concentration in China 
Studies and Conflict Management. After 
graduating from SAIS, she joined the U.S.-
China Policy Foundation as a Program and 
Research Assistant. She can be reached at 
rona.vaselaar@gmail.com.
Brian Hart
Brian Hart is a 2018 graduate of the Hop-
kins-Nanjing Center and a current M.A. 
student at SAIS concentrating in China 
Studies. He earned a B.A in Politics and 
International Affairs from Wake Forest 
University and has interned at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, the 
Project 2049 Institute, and Trivium China, 
where his work has focused on U.S.-China 
relations, Chinese politics, and Chinese 
tech innovation. He can be reached at 
hartbt10@gmail.com.
Jake Morris 
Jake Morris is a first year SAIS M.A. candidate 
with a primary concentration in Strategic 
Studies and a minor in China Studies. 
Jake is pursuing a five-year combined BA/
MA program with Hopkins’ undergradu-
ate campus in Baltimore. He has studied 
abroad in Yunnan and worked for Sena-
tor Chris Murphy. He can be reached at 
jakemaxmorris@gmail.com.
Tarela Osuobeni
Tarela Osuobeni is a second year SAIS 
M.A. candidate in China Studies. Prior to 
enrolling at SAIS, Tarela studied Chinese 
and American studies at the Hopkins-Nan-
jing Center. Her research interests include 
political risk in Asia, Chinese politics, and 
China-Africa relations. She can be reached 
at tosuobeni@gmail.com.
Qiang Wu
Qiang Wu is an MIPP candidate with a 
concentration in China Studies. Prior to 
enrolling at SAIS, Qiang worked for the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the National 
People’s Congress in Beijing, China and 
earned his M.A. degree in Economics at 
Kyoto University, Japan. He is interested in 
the dynamic interaction between China’s 
domestic politics and its foreign policies. 
He can be reached at qwu25@jhu.edu.






















 vol 5  | 2019
Table of 
Contents





Sino-Capitalism: Demystifying the 






China’s Influence on Interpol: 
Progress and Pushback 
Sam Boone 
7
Challenges to SOE Mixed Ownership 
Reform in China: A Case Study
Dominic Chiu 
21
Hedging its Bets: China’s Strategies 
in Pursuing Global Food Security 
Anna Woods 
31
Organizational Reform as a Key 
Driver of Chinese Military Innovation 
Brian Hart 
44




Setting a New Standard: 












 vol 5  | 2019
Letter from 
the Editor
We are truly happy to present to you, our 
fellow SAIS affiliates and the broader China 
Studies community, the fifth edition of the 
Johns Hopkins SAIS China Studies Review 
(CSR). The following pages explore recent 
economic, technological, and political devel-
opments in China—and what they mean for 
the United States and for international gov-
ernance at large. 
Our edition begins with Shangsi Zhou’s 
exploration of the unconventional growth 
of market capitalism in China’s state-gov-
erned economy. Her essay is followed by 
Sam Boone’s timely review of China’s rela-
tionship with the International Criminal 
Police Organization (Interpol), reflecting on 
the ways in which China uses international 
organizations to fulfill domestic goals. The 
next article is Dominic Chiu’s review of the 
inefficiency of China’s state sector and the 
inherent difficulties that exist in reforming 
state-owned enterprises. The fourth entry is 
Anna Woods’ examination of China’s growing 
food insecurity and the ways in which China 
leverages international organizations and 
multilateral relationships in attempts to mit-
igate future shortages. Her work is followed 
by Brian Hart’s research regarding technolog-
ical innovation in China in terms of strategic 
military development, and how this impacts 
U.S.-China technological competition. Next, 
Kevin Garrahan examines China’s path to 
becoming a world leader of innovation, 
and the challenges presented by China’s 
current economic structure to this transition. 
Finally, Michael Sutherland concludes this 
edition with his review of China’s transition 
from a “standards taker” to an international 
“standards maker,” and what this means for 
international governance organizations. 
I believe that I speak for all of us, student 
authors and editors alike, in saying that not 
only did we gain in knowledge and profes-
sionalism throughout this process, but we 
also contributed to—and became a more 
intimately connected part of—the broader 
China Studies and SAIS network. We deeply 
appreciate your readership, your support, 
and your continued involvement in the 
China Studies Review. 
The research contained within this edition 
was conducted by students during their time 
at SAIS. Submissions were selected by our 
talented team of student editors via a dou-
ble-blind review of anonymized manuscripts. 
Each paper was given an overall score of 
“strong reject,” “weak reject,” “weak accept,” 
or “strong accept.” The minimum require-
ment for publication was two double-blind 
strong accept results; all papers meeting 
this requirement were accepted. In scoring 
these papers, our team of editors adhered 
to a specific set of guidelines designed for 
CSR. For your perusal, this guide is located 
on the SAIS CSR website at saiscsr.org, under 
the tab “reviewer guidelines.”
We would love to hear from you. Please 
don’t hesitate to reach out to both our 
authors and editors, whose respective 
emails are included in their short biog-
raphies. In addition, we are proud to 
announce that the 2018–2019 CSR team 
will now be accepting alumni publications 
for the website; we welcome you to submit 
your China-related research to saischina 
studiesreview@gmail.com for review. Enjoy 
this edition, the fifth volume of the China 
Studies Review! 
Naomi Garcia
Naomi Garcia is a second year SAIS M.A. 
candidate with a dual concentration in China 
Studies and Korea Studies. Naomi is currently 
an intern at the National Bureau of Asian 
Research. Prior to enrolling at SAIS, Naomi 
attended the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, during 
which time she was an intern at the Amer-
ican Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai. 


















Shangsi Zhou is a second year SAIS M.A. 
student concentrating in International 
Political Economy. Her research interests 
include the political economy of develop-
ment, transitional economies, comparative 
institutional analysis, and social inclusion. 
She was previously an intern at the John 
L. Thornton China Center of the Brook-
ings Institution. She can be reached at 
sapphirachow@gmail.com.
Is authoritarianism inherently incompatible 
with, or does it only provide barren soil for, 
the seeding of a capitalist market economy? 
Political economists have long debated the 
feasibility of symbiosis between two seem-
ingly contradictory forces, i.e., market and 
state, in facilitating economic develop-
ment. Conventional analysis supports the 
view that democracy, rather than authori-
tarianism, provides more fertile ground for 
fostering a capitalist economy and growth.1 
However, the rise of China, an authoritar-
ian party-state embracing the ideas of 
marketization and globalization, seems 
to empirically challenge the conventional 
wisdom, which claims capitalism can only 
flourish in liberal democracies.
Despite the ongoing controversy about the 
sustainability of the Chinese authoritarian 
capitalism model, there is no doubt that the 
realization of China’s phenomenal catch-up 
success should be credited to its idiosyn-
cratic innovation of a dual-functioning 
political-economic structure.2 The unique 
“Sino-capitalist” model,3 or as others have 
termed it, the model of “directed impro-
visation,”4 “structured uncertainty,”5 or 
“experimentation under hierarchy,”6 cre-
ates a middle ground between central 
planning and a laissez-faire approach. 
It enables China to harness both state 
capacity and market forces by combining 
top-down bureaucratic leadership with 
bottom-up experimentation with local 
agents and markets.7 Therefore, based on 
the existing literature on Chinese political 
economy, this commentary argues that 
the institutional innovation of an adaptive 
dual-track political-economic system, which 
safeguards both the state and the market, 
is the key to understanding how China can 
overcome the contradictions and develop 
synergies between political guidance and 
market competition.8 This essay will draw 
upon the examples of institutional inno-
vations in business sector development 
(consisting of both state-owned and pri-
vate enterprises), foreign investment and 
trade liberalization, and domestic industrial 
upgrading in the global production system. 
As each case shows, Chinese institutional 
innovation has been a careful compromise 
between the pre-existing institutional leg-
acies, i.e., China’s socialist authoritarian 
system, and the subsequent modification 
or creation of novel institutions to promote 
a market economy.
The development of China’s business 
sector has been marked by a series of 
policy innovations for the advancement of 
state-market coevolution. A peculiar feature 
of the business sector in China has been the 
vacillations between power centralization 
and further relaxation of the party-state’s 
control over the economy. As stated by Hei-
lman,9 Naughton and Tsai,10 and Chen,11 
the reform of state-owned enterprises in 
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China remains one of the most challenging 
tasks because of the vested political inter-
ests in this reform and its stake in regime 
stability. Nevertheless, this top-down grad-
ualist reform approach does not preclude 
policy experimentations that work for the 
realization of both useful central guidance 
and marketization. The policy of “grasping 
the large and letting go of the small” (抓大
放小, zhuada fang xiao) in the mid-1990s 
and the creation of the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commis-
sion (SASAC) in the early 2000s are cases 
in point. Compared with China’s past under 
the central planning system and with its 
Asian democratic counterparts, these two 
reform initiatives improved the competi-
tiveness of large SOEs with the purpose 
of creating industrial champions as a means 
of defending national interests; they also 
increased market competitiveness by relin-
quishing the state’s direct control over 
smaller SOEs. 
However, relaxation of the state’s direct 
control over privatized SOEs and the 
booming private sector in China does not 
equate with weakened party-state guidance 
over the increasingly complex economy. 
Instead, China’s government has been 
able to adapt to this relative decentraliza-
tion by embedding itself in the changing 
socio-economic structures during business 
sector reforms.12 In China’s private busi-
ness sector, co-optation in the form of the 
recruitment of private entrepreneurs into 
the party system—”wearing red hats”—can 
be viewed as an institutional innovation that 
helps construct a mutually beneficial rela-
tionship between the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and private entrepreneurs. For 
the CCP rulers, recruiting entrepreneurs 
into the CCP enables them to appease 
political dissidents and to consolidate 
state-business connections in China. These 
connections help maintain, albeit indirectly, 
the dominance of the CCP over the regime 
and enable the rulers to share the material 
rent generated by the private sector.13 On 
the other hand, private entrepreneurs are 
also motivated to join the CCP since it helps 
establish good political connections (关系, 
guanxi) that are important when doing busi-
ness in China; it also helps business elites 
advance their political careers, knowing 
Party membership acts as a political career 
entry ticket in China.14 In the end, corpo-
rate governance over both the state-owned 
enterprises and private enterprises in China 
has been driven by institutional innovation 
that takes into account the duality of the 
state and the market that is specific to the 
Chinese context.
Regarding foreign economic relations, China 
has successfully integrated into the global 
economy through foreign investment and 
international trade by formulating an inno-
vative dual-track system, harnessing both the 
forces of the state as well as the market. The 
key enabling factor for China’s transforma-
tion into the world’s workshop and source of 
outward investment relies on policy experi-
mentation under the overarching guidance 
of the central government, which stimulates 
the reception and internalization of interna-
tional capital while maintaining the smooth 
channeling of policy information from the 
top. The development of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs), beginning in the 1980s, could 
The economic rent generated from the significant 
enhancement of China’s global competitiveness through 
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be viewed as another case of China’s adaptive 
institutional experimentation. As indicated by 
the name, SEZs refer to a limited number of 
designated pilot regions that adopt more 
favorable and liberalized economic policies 
than found in other parts of the country. A 
critical objective of SEZs is to expand foreign 
trade and investment, and more implicitly 
to introduce and internalize foreign capital, 
resources, and technical know-how from 
abroad without overthrowing the overarching 
state supervision.15 The unique policy cycle 
in the governance of investment and trade 
enables the state to conjoin its guidance 
from above and secure competitive market 
forces from below, and the economic rent 
generated from the significant enhancement 
of China’s global competitiveness through 
guided liberalization, in turn, sustains the 
resilience of authoritarianism in China.16
Accordingly, the final point concerns the 
creative way in which China manages to 
deal with the competing forces of the 
state and market in domestic technolog-
ical development, which enables it to 
move up the global value chain from low-
end labor-intensive industries to high-end 
capital-intensive industries through manu-
facturing-centered upgrading.17According 
to Breznitz and Murphree18 and Chen,19 
economic growth and industrial innovation 
in China rely on the invention of a hybrid 
institutional network that, on the one hand, 
creates enough space and leeway for local 
innovation. On the other hand, it preserves 
a significant amount of steering and over-
seeing capacities from above so as to 
mitigate the cost of market failure during 
the innovation process. In other words, 
domestic industrial upgrading in China is 
another result of the experimentation with 
a hybrid institutional framework, driven by 
a combination of trial and error by local 
agents and final guidance in decision-mak-
ing at the top. 
This commentary reviews the development 
trajectories of China’s business sector, its 
investment and trade liberalization, and 
its industrial upgrading that faces external 
competition from the global market. As 
each case shows, the reason China can 
reconcile the competing forces of the 
state and market is attributed to its institu-
tional innovation of an adaptive dual-track 
political-economic system preserving the 
interactions between the state and the 
market. This idiosyncratic institutional inno-
vation is established to balance between 
the country’s socialist institutional legacies 
and its need for economic development, 
by incorporating entrepreneurial forces at 
the local level.20 The sustainability of this 
“Sino-capitalism” model remains hard to 
predict considering the incompleteness of 
China’s market transition, but the invention 
of this innovative political-economic model 
provides an institutional explanation for the 
Chinese economic miracle through the past 
forty years of reform and opening-up.
1   For example, see: Seymour Martin Lipset, 
“Some Social Requisites of Democracy: 
Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 
53, no.1 (1959): 69-105; Adam Smith and 
Edwin Cannan, The Wealth of Nations (New 
York, N.Y: Bantam Classic, 2003); William J. 
Baumol, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J. Schramm, 
Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the 
Economics of Growth and Prosperity (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Joseph 
A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (Oxon: Routledge, 2010).
2   Sebastian Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation 
in China’s Economic Rise,” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 43, 
no. 1 (December 27, 2007): 1–26; Kellee Tsai, 
Capitalism without Democracy: The Private 
Sector in Contemporary China (Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press, 2007); Dan Breznitz 
and Michael Murphree, Run of the Red Queen: 
Government, Innovation, Globalization, and 
Economic Growth in China (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2011); Yuen Yuen 
Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2016); 
Christopher McNally, “Sino-Capitalism: China’s 
Reemergence and the International Political 
Economy,” World Politics 64, no. 4 (2012): 
741-776.
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Reemergence and the International Political 
Economy,” 741-776.
4   Ang, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap.
5   Breznitz and Murphree, Run of the Red Queen: 
Government, Innovation, Globalization, and 
Economic Growth in China.
6   Sebastian Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in 
China’s Economic Rise.” 
7   McNally, “Sino-Capitalism: China’s 
Reemergence and the International Political 
Economy,” 741-776.
8   Barry Naughton and Kellee S. Tsai, 
“Introduction,” in State Capitalism, Institutional 
Adaptation, and the Chinese Miracle, eds. Barry 
Naughton and Kellee S. Tsai (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1-24.
9   Sebastian Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in 
China’s Economic Rise.”
10   Naughton and Tsai, State Capitalism, Institutional 
Adaptation, and the Chinese Miracle.
11   Ling Chen, “Playing the Market Reform Card: 
The Changing Patterns of Political Struggle 
in China’s Electric Power Sector,” The China 
Journal, no. 64 (July 1, 2010): 69–95.
12   Naughton and Tsai, State Capitalism, Institutional 
Adaptation, and the Chinese Miracle; Ang, 
How China Escaped the Poverty Trap; McNally, 
“Sino-Capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the 
International Political Economy.” 
13   Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: The Private 
Sector in Contemporary China; Bruce J. Dickson, 
Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s 
Embrace of China’s Private Sector (Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Nicholas R. Lardy, Markets over Mao: The Rise of 
Private Business in China (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014).
14   Bruce J. Dickson, Wealth into Power: The 
Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s 
Private Sector.
15   Heilmann, “Policy Experimentation in China’s 
Economic Rise.” 
16   Mary Gallagher, “Reform and Openness: Why 
China’s Economic Reforms have Delayed 
Democracy,” World Politics 54, no. 3 (April 
2002): 338-372. 
17   Edward Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why 
China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West (New 
York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
18   Breznitz and Murphree, Run of the Red Queen: 
Government, Innovation, Globalization, and 
Economic Growth in China.
19   Ling Chen, “The Microfoundation of State 
Intervention and Policy Effectiveness,” in 
Manipulating Globalization: The Influence of 
Bureaucrats on Business in China, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2018), 93-130.
20   Naughton and Tsai, State Capitalism, Institutional 
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Introduction
As China continues down its road of mod-
ernization, China’s leaders hope to increase 
not only their country’s economic strength 
but also its international political influence. 
Since the People’s Republic of China joined 
the United Nations in 1971, China has been 
gradually increasing its role in interna-
tional organizations and becoming more 
intertwined in the network of international 
structures largely constructed by the United 
States and its allies following the end of 
World War II. 
This paper focuses on China’s influence on 
the International Criminal Police Organiza-
tion (Interpol)1 as well as the organization’s 
effects on China. It aims to add to the exist-
ing literature on how China engages with, 
and may be transforming, international 
institutions. China has recently become 
a more active member in Interpol as the 
country seeks to bring home Chinese 
citizens, accused of corruption and terror-
ism, who have fled abroad. The election 
of Chinese Vice Minister of Public Security 
Meng Hongwei to be president of Interpol 
in 2016 signaled that China had become a 
leading country in the organization. How-
ever, China’s October 2018 arrest and 
subsequent March 2019 expulsion of Meng 
from the Communist Party on the pretext of 
bribery charges creates uncertainty about 
China’s future relationship with Interpol. 
A number of human rights activists have 
accused China of abusing Interpol’s Red 
Notice System (RNS), designed to locate 
and provisionally arrest individuals pend-
ing an extradition agreement. In an effort 
to repatriate Chinese nationals wanted by 
Chinese authorities for violating Chinese 
restrictions on political or religious activ-
ism, China has abused the guidelines laid 
out in the Interpol Constitution. This paper 
addresses what China gains from increased 
participation in Interpol and how effective 
it has been in influencing the organization 
for its own benefit. 
The idea of an authoritarian country that 
does not practice the rule of law heading 
the International Criminal Police Organiza-
tion had caused some people to question 
the purpose of the organization. However, 
a closer look at recent developments paints 
a more complicated picture. Focusing on 
China’s use of Interpol’s RNS, this paper 
finds that, while China does attempt to 
manipulate the RNS for political purposes, 
it has not succeeded so far in changing the 
rules or norms of the organization. The 
history of Interpol’s relations with human 
rights and the top-down structure of the 
organization creates a difficult environment 
for China to alter the organization’s rules 
and norms. Nonetheless, China still exerts a 
large influence in the organization through 
its ability to shape the agenda on topics 
ranging from the Belt and Road Initiative, 
to Taiwan’s exclusion from the organization, 
to technological changes that affect inter-
national policing. For the most part, the 
relationship between Interpol and China 
has been symbiotic, since the organization 
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has assisted China in pursuing fugitives 
abroad, but human rights watchdogs and 
countries that adhere to the rule of law still 
play the dominant role in maintaining the 
core values of the organization.
Theoretical Approach  
and Scope
This paper takes a fundamentally realist 
approach to understanding how China 
attempts to influence international organi-
zations and how international organizations 
affect China in return. According to realists, 
international organizations are a reflection 
of state power formulated to further the 
security of powerful states. States engage 
in these organizations to project power and 
accomplish unilateral goals. Mearsheimer’s 
realist description of international organi-
zations as a “set of rules that stipulate the 
ways in which states should cooperate and 
compete with each other, and which are 
embodied in their personnel and budget” 
serves as a useful framework for how China 
interacts with Interpol.2 China, like other 
countries, joined Interpol to increase its 
own security and to combat criminals 
harmful to their state’s well-being. However, 
states also find some of Interpol’s limita-
tions counterproductive to their goals and 
seek to either bypass the rules or, when 
possible, exert their influence to change 
the rules and norms of the organization. 
Overall, China approves of the overarch-
ing framework of Interpol’s respect for state 
sovereignty, but this does not preclude 
China from attempting to shape the rules 
to help achieve its domestic goals.
This analysis is divided into six sections. The 
first part will examine the history, evolution, 
and structure of Interpol, focusing on how 
other nations have affected the organiza-
tion, to provide context for the analysis of 
China’s role in the organization. The second 
section will examine what China aspires to 
gain through influencing Interpol, as well 
as how Interpol can benefit from increased 
Chinese participation. The third section will 
highlight the strengths and weaknesses of 
the RNS. The fourth section will compare 
Chinese “Red Notices” with Article 3 of the 
Interpol Constitution, which ensures Inter-
pol’s non-intervention in cases of a political, 
religious, military, or racial character, to 
determine if China is abusing the system. 
The fifth section will demonstrate how Inter-
pol is responding to authoritarian abuse of 
the RNS. The concluding section considers 
other ways in which China can increase its 
influence in Interpol in the future, which 
also suggests areas for future research. 
The History and  
Structure of Interpol
When China3 assumed Taiwan’s position in 
Interpol in 1984, it joined an international 
organization with a long and contentious 
history. Interpol was originally established 
in 1923 as the International Criminal Police 
Commission (ICPC) in Vienna to address 
the rising threat of cross-border crime 
following World War I.4 The founding 20 
countries, mostly located in Europe, cre-
ated the ICPC to direct police-to-police 
communication links on an international 
scale, with a central headquarters relaying 
information and news to member coun-
tries.5 One of the key tenets of the ICPC 
was its respect for national sovereignty, 
meaning that it could not force countries 
to accept requests by other parties. Despite 
the limited scope of operations, the orga-
nization faced an existential crisis with the 
onset of World War II. 
Following the Nazi invasion of Austria in 
1939, Nazi Germany took over the ICPC by 
replacing the head of the ICPC with a Nazi 
Austrian and later moving the headquar-
ters to Berlin.6 Soon after, the Nazis altered 
search warrants to include an entry for race 
alongside one for religion and utilized the 
ICPC network in their hunt to arrest Jewish 
refugees.7 Following the atrocities of World 
War II, police forces gathered in 1946 to 
re-establish the international organiza-
tion as the International Criminal Police 
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Organization (ICPO).8 Other than moving 
the headquarters to France, the organi-
zation remained very similar to the ICPC. 
Under the politically charged environment 
of the Cold War, Czechoslovakia used the 
RNS to track down and capture political dis-
sidents who had received political asylum 
in West Germany.9 Considering this a vio-
lation of national sovereignty, the director 
of the FBI decided to withdraw the U.S. as 
a member of the ICPO in protest. Losing 
the U.S. constituted a disaster and eventu-
ally forced the organization to adopt a new 
constitution in 1956.10 The new constitution 
included Article 2, which embedded the 
principles and rules of the organization 
with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and Article 3, which forbade the 
organization’s involvement in cases consid-
ered political, military, religious, or racial in 
nature.11 Along with the constitution, the 
organization officially rebranded itself as 
Interpol and the United States fully rejoined 
the organization, but this would not be the 
last major change.
In 1971, Interpol signed a treaty with the UN 
to formally designate itself an intergovern-
mental organization.12 Soon after, countries 
became ever more frustrated with Interpol 
as it refused to act on terrorism cases due 
to their inherently political nature. Interpol 
risked obsolescence when it refused to act 
after the Palestinian terrorist attack at the 
1972 Munich Olympics and when coun-
tries sought help in tracking down Nazi 
War criminals.13 Following pressure from 
the developed countries, Interpol finally 
passed two resolutions in 1984 to directly 
address counter-terrorism. The first allowed 
“violent crime known as terrorism” to be 
pursued within the organization’s consti-
tutional mandate by linking it to ordinary 
crime.14 The second resolution modified 
Article 3 to state that a violent political act 
outside a “conflict area” does not count as 
political, which allowed Interpol to address 
“foreign terrorism” in Europe or the United 
States.15 Following the 9/11 attacks of 2001 
in New York City, the United States success-
fully filed Red Notices for crimes against 
humanity. 16 Interpol streamlined itself to 
focus on a select number of crimes, such 
as terrorism and public safety, international 
fugitives, drug and criminal organizations, 
human trafficking, and financial and high-
tech crimes.17 The most important change 
in recent years has been the implementation 
of the I-24/7, an internet-based encrypted 
communication system that allows imme-
diate access and communication between 
Interpol and member countries.18 
Interpol is composed of 190 member 
nations and is led by a secretary general 
who acts as its chief executive officer. 
There is also an executive committee of 
13 members, including the president. The 
president’s role is largely ceremonial, as 
the president does not have the power to 
issue alerts.19 The Executive Committee 
sets the agenda for the General Assem-
bly, where the organization’s final authority 
lies. Interpol is similar to the UN in that 
every country has one vote in the General 
Assembly, which has led the balance of 
power to shift to developing countries.20 
Every member country has a National Cen-
tral Bureau (NCB) that links the country’s 
national police to Interpol’s network.21 The 
Overall, China approves of the overarching framework  
of Interpol’s respect for state sovereignty, but this does 
not preclude China from attempting to shape the rules  
to help achieve its domestic goals.
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members of the Executive Committee have 
the most power because they meet three 
times a year and decide the organization’s 
policy and direction, but it is impossible 
for them to pass resolutions without the 
support of the General Assembly, which 
meets only once a year.22 The members 
of the Executive Committee change every 
three years23 on a geographic rotation.24 
Throughout its history, Interpol has tradi-
tionally been led by secretary generals from 
France, Britain, or the United States, and 
developed countries have held a majority 
of the executive positions.25 The number 
of executive seats that the Europeans hold 
certainly gives them more decision-making 
ability relative to the size of their popula-
tion. This makes it difficult for countries such 
as Russia, Turkey, or China to dictate the 
policy agenda of Interpol without compro-
mising with the Europeans and Americans. 
There are no significant political or economic 
requirements for Interpol membership, with 
nations only required to pay the minimal 
annual membership fee which in 2017 
amounted to $16,310.26 This is the mini-
mal basic rate, but countries can contribute 
more if they desire—in 2017, the United 
States willingly paid the highest member 
dues at a total of about $12,694,580; mean-
while, China represented the sixth-highest 
total, paying around 1/5th of the U.S. con-
tribution.27 Interpol does not have a body 
that would be analogous to the UN Security 
Council and, in voting, countries that pay 
more get no more power than those who 
make the minimum payment. Historically, 
there has generally been a strong correla-
tion between membership dues and the 
likelihood of a seat on the Executive Com-
mittee.28 This might explain why European 
countries, who are consistently among the 
biggest contributors, continue to dominate 
positions on the Executive Committee.
To pass a resolution, a country first must 
either have a seat on the Executive Commit-
tee or have another nation pass its message 
through the committee to put its proposal 
on the agenda. Second, the country must 
rally support in the General Assembly. A 
change in popular sentiment from a large 
enough contingency of member states can 
lead to resolutions that change Interpol’s 
laws. The United States and Europe took 
advantage of a global shift in attitudes 
towards terrorism to push for changes 
inside the organization. However, if the 
organization becomes fractured by ideo-
logical politics, such as during the Cold 
War, the organization can lose its effective-
ness. Although it remains unlikely, the lack 
of a binding agreement does leave open 
the possibility that countries could leave 
in protest if they feel the organization has 
become a political tool for authoritarian 
countries. Previous experiences with Com-
munist satellite states and Nazi Germany 
have made the organization very aware of 
the dangers when authoritarian regimes 
attempt to use Interpol for political gains. 
China would be smart to strive for change 
from within the framework of the constitu-
tion, while convincing other countries that 
change is necessary to create an Interpol 
that functions well in the modern world. 
China’s Goals in Interpol
In many aspects, Interpol is a perfect match 
for China’s goals—not only in terms of 
domestic politics, but also for how China 
imagines itself in the world. Xi Jinping used 
his common phrase “mutual benefit and 
win-win outcomes” (坚持互利共赢, jianchi 
huli gongying) in his speech to the Inter-
pol General Assembly in 2017.29 China has 
been ramping up its support for the orga-
nization and the 2016 election of Meng 
Hongwei as president, while largely cere-
monial, seemed to be a stamp of approval 
for China’s hard work and dedication to 
promoting Interpol. Tim Morris, Interpol’s 
Executive Director of Security Policy, said 
that “China has been a very important 
member of Interpol and contributed in 
all different ways,” while Ursula Martinez, 
head of Interpol’s Command and Coor-
dination Center, claimed, “China is really 
important for operations located in Asian 
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countries.”30 In 2016, China gathered and 
reported two million pieces of information 
regarding stolen and lost Chinese identi-
fication documents.31 That same year, the 
Chinese Ministry of Public Security also 
claimed that they cooperated with foreign 
authorities on 4,460 different cases.32 This 
information is helpful not only for bring-
ing Chinese criminals home, but also for 
keeping other countries safe. During his 
speech, Xi promised China that he would 
devote resources to training 5,000 law 
enforcement agents, assisting in upgrad-
ing Interpol’s communication network, and 
increasing Interpol’s global influence.33 
China can also gain substantially from its 
membership in Interpol. Since 2012, Xi Jin-
ping has engaged in a sweeping campaign 
to repatriate Chinese citizens suspected 
of corruption and terrorism.34 During that 
same period, China has issued approxi-
mately 200 Red Notices a year.35 In 2015, 
China issued 100 Red Notices against eco-
nomic fugitives as part of Operation Skynet, 
which seeks to repatriate corrupt Chinese 
officials and businessmen.36 High-level 
corruption is a sensitive topic in China and 
addressing it is something that Xi feels is 
vital to long-term security, as well as to the 
success of the Communist Party.37 China 
wants to show its citizens that the state can 
extend its reach anywhere in the world. The 
Global Times states that “corrupt officials 
who might have thought about escaping 
will not dare do it now, after such tight mea-
sures and cooperation with a wide range 
of countries.”38 Other state-run media even 
suggested that Meng’s election itself would 
be a boon to the international expansion 
of Chinese efforts to repatriate corrupt cit-
izens.39 Apart from corruption, China also 
hopes to use the Interpol network to work 
with other countries in the fight against Isla-
mist militants in Xinjiang.40 China hopes to 
crack down on Uighurs who have fled the 
country and have ties to extremist groups 
within its own borders. In Meng Hongwei’s 
speech to the General Assembly in 2017, 
he emphasized the threat of terrorism and 
stressed the importance of unity.41 Interpol 
has been focused on terrorism for several 
decades now, but where China seems to 
be making the largest push is in regard to 
corruption. Li Shulei, who leads the Chinese 
repatriation efforts for the Central Commis-
sion for Discipline Inspection, claimed that 
China must “build a new order to fight inter-
national corruption… and cut off escape 
routes for corrupt elements.”42 China 
believes that Interpol can help the country 
accomplish its goals of counter-terrorism 
and fighting corruption. Worryingly, many 
Western countries would say there is also a 
third area under attack—political dissidents. 
Trying to separate political dissidents from 
the first two categories can be a tricky task 
but it is vital in order to assess China’s pres-
ent and future impact on the organization.
In addition to its fight against corruption 
and terrorism, China also places impor-
tance on being seen as a responsible 
power. China not only wants to use Inter-
pol as a tool to accomplish its goals, but 
also to give its actions more legitimacy. 
Shortly following Meng’s 2016 election to 
the leadership of Interpol, Beijing Youth 
Daily published an article proclaiming Inter-
pol to be the most effective platform for 
combating international crime, while also 
signaling that the election demonstrated 
that international society is recognizing 
and accepting China’s version of the rule 
of law.43 While this newspaper is certainly 
exaggerating, the election of Meng did 
seem to indicate a certain approval within 
Interpol of China’s actions. In Xi’s speech, 
he stresses the “rule of law” both in his 
introduction as well as in his proposals 
for what Interpol should focus on in the 
years to come.44 China is most likely more 
interested in appearing to be a rule of law 
country than in actually becoming one. The 
sudden arrest of Meng in China in Octo-
ber 2018 demonstrates that China views its 
own version of justice as superseding the 
integrity of an international organization. It 
is crucial to acknowledge two factors at play 
against each other. On one hand, China is 
using the RNS to assist in its anti-graft and 
counter-terrorism repatriation campaigns, 
THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS12
which leads to complications with Article 
3 of Interpol’s Constitution when political 
dissent is involved; on the other hand, 
China wants to conform to the standards 
of Interpol’s review process to be seen as a 
responsible member of the organization. If 
China is seen as cheating the system, Chi-
nese officials will be less likely to obtain 
Executive Committee positions in the 
future, thereby decreasing their ability to 
drive change from within the organization. 
How Do Red Notices Function?
While Interpol operates 17 databases 
to assist in solving crimes, the only one 
explored in this paper is the oldest and most 
famous database, the criminal database. 
The criminal database, now synonymous 
with the RNS, is a collection of names of all 
the wanted criminals from around the world 
with outstanding Red Notices. A Red Notice 
is a request to locate and provisionally 
arrest an individual pending extradition, 
and is issued by the General Secretariat.45 
While Interpol makes it very clear that this 
is not the same as an international arrest 
warrant, this is the closest instrument to an 
arrest warrant that exists within Interpol. 
Unlike international arrest warrants, Red 
Notices are issued by a country but can 
be ignored by other member countries 
and are largely dependent on extra-
dition treaties between the parties 
involved.46 Red Notices are processed 
through the Commission for the Con-
trol of Interpol Files (CCF); however, it 
is not the CCF’s job to decide guilt or 
innocence, but rather to streamline the 
process and to ensure that the request 
comports with the constitution.47
One of the major RNS foundations is 
the inherent assumption that a country’s 
request is in accord with Interpol policy.48 
Interpol functions as though there is a 
common understanding for the desig-
nation of criminals, despite the fact that 
political asylum, differing definitions of 
terrorist groups, and espionage all provide 
clear examples that this is not true.49 The 
system is based on trust that all requests 
are legitimate, because there are limits to 
what Interpol can do to make sure countries 
abide by the constitution. In 2011, Inter-
pol issued around 21 Red Notices a day 
and admitted that 97 percent of requests 
were not reviewed in depth due to limited 
personnel.50 During the same period, an 
Interpol investigation showed that 28 per-
cent of Red Notices came from countries 
that had Freedom House scores of “no civil 
liberties,” while 50 percent of Red Notices 
came from countries with a “high level of 
corruption” based on Freedom House’s 
transparency index.51 Interpol is an opaque 
organization out of necessity, so it is diffi-
cult for the public to find data to prove or 
disprove this assumption. 
Red Notices constitute an important part 
of China’s repatriation strategy, but other 
methods have accompanied the use 
of the RNS. The RNS itself is a capable 
tool because it freezes all international 
bank accounts and increases travel restric-
tions for designated individuals.52 Of the 
While frozen bank accounts, travel restrictions, and fear 
of arrest could be factors, it is most probable that these 
targets returned home because of harassment of  
their families and loved ones.
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100 criminals placed on the RNS through 
Operation Skynet, 51 have already been 
repatriated.53 However, this overempha-
sizes the power of the RNS because 35 of 
the 51 criminals “voluntarily” returned to 
China.54 While frozen bank accounts, travel 
restrictions, and fear of arrest could be fac-
tors, it is most probable that these targets 
returned home because of harassment of 
their families and loved ones.
Interviews with five Red Notice individuals, 
who wished to remain anonymous, indi-
cated that Chinese authorities subjected 
their families to threats, and in some sit-
uations, arbitrary detention.55 China has 
shown they are not afraid to use extrale-
gal methods, and they have even used Red 
Notices to justify the systematic harassing 
of families. While it is in the nature of Inter-
pol to not comment on the political actions 
of member countries, it must be noted that, 
even in cases in which China is within its 
rights to issue a Red Notice, it increases 
the effectiveness of these notices through 
methods that fall outside of limits on how 
rule of law countries should operate. 
Case Studies
This section seeks to place Chinese Red 
Notice cases in the context of Interpol’s Arti-
cle 3 Repository of Practice, a guidebook 
published by Interpol that provides exam-
ples and explanations for what constitutes 
a violation of the constitution. These case 
studies reflect a significant bias owing to 
the fact that these represent what might 
be seen as the most egregious notices 
instead of the average notice. One issue 
is that quantitative research is difficult, as 
the public Interpol database in 201856 
only contains 82 Chinese criminals with 
outstanding Red Notices.57 As each coun-
try can select which Red Notices can be 
made public, the published cases on the 
Interpol website contain inherent biases. 
However, studying the prominent cases 
does have its advantages. These are the 
cases that receive the most media attention 
and are most likely to inform key officials, 
policy makers, and public opinion. Even if 
these cases only represent a small number 
of notices on China’s behalf, the damage 
they can do to the credibility of both Inter-
pol and China is substantial. 
Case Study I: Dolkun Isa
The first case study focuses on Dolkun Isa 
and the Chinese Red Notice seeking his 
arrest for terrorism that dates back to 1999. 
Political activism in Xinjiang has long been a 
thorn in China’s side, and this autonomous 
region holds a large number of ethnic and 
religious minorities. Most of China’s focus 
on terrorism concerns this province and, in 
the eyes of the government, there is little 
difference between political activism and 
terrorism.58 China blames the instability 
and unrest in Xinjiang on separatist Isla-
mist militants. As of December 2018, it is 
estimated that as many as 1 million Uighurs 
are currently being held in “re-education 
camps.”59 Dolkun Isa fled China in the early 
1990s in a move he describes as escap-
ing persecution for his political views.60 
China issued a Red Notice against Isa in 
1997 and later put him on the country’s 
most-wanted terrorist list in 2003.61 After 
receiving political refugee status in Ger-
many, Isa became the secretary general of 
the Munich-based World Uighur Congress, 
which advocates for political and religious 
rights for Uighurs.62 International travel 
became more difficult for Isa following his 
Red Notice warrant—he was briefly detained 
in South Korea in 2009, arrested in Italy in 
2017, and denied a visa from India.63 Despite 
the case being relatively high profile and the 
weak evidence on the part of China, the Red 
Notice remained in place from 1997 until its 
reversal in March 2018. 
China’s evidence for Isa’s crime primarily 
rested on his purported relationship to ter-
rorist groups in Xinjiang. While at Xinjiang 
University in the 1980s, Isa participated in 
several pro-democracy movements and 
was expelled from school for distributing 
books about Uighur history and culture.64 
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China is not necessarily accusing Isa himself 
of violent crime, but rather of association 
with terrorist groups. The Interpol Article 
3 Repository states that, while freedom 
of expression is not an absolute right, 
“insulting authorities are among those 
rights that by very nature fall within the 
scope of Article 3.”65 According to current 
practice, speaking out against the nature 
of the government apparatus in Xinjiang 
inherently places the case in a political 
category. The repository states that, in the 
context of political unrest, “the predomi-
nance test will have to be applied where 
there are elements of both a political nature 
and an ordinary-law crime nature.”66 Even 
if passing out illicit materials constituted an 
ordinary crime in Xinjiang, under these cir-
cumstances, the predominance test should 
identify the nature of this crime to be over-
whelmingly political. China’s final argument 
is guilt through association with terrorist 
groups. Even though Interpol has a spe-
cial provision in the rules to deny freedom 
of association with terrorist groups, the 
current practice lays down specific guide-
lines for what constitutes membership in 
a terrorist organization. Section 3.6 of the 
repository outlines that the terrorist nature 
of the organization must be recognized by 
international entities such as the United 
Nations, and that the individual practices 
active and meaningful involvement in said 
organization beyond mere general support 
of its political goals.67 Dolkun Isa’s case 
would certainly not apply as there is no evi-
dence of active membership in any Islamist 
militant group, and Isa actively denounces 
the use of terrorist tactics no matter the cir-
cumstance. The lack of evidence for any 
active membership in a terrorist group 
makes it impossible for his case to fall out-
side of Article 3 on the merits of guilt by 
association, and Isa’s right to free speech 
is protected by the Interpol Constitution. 
The Red Notice harassing Isa for 21 years 
seems to clearly represent an abuse of the 
system that took too long to correct.
Case Study II: Guo Wengui 
The next case study focuses on the Red 
Notice for Guo Wengui and the charges 
against him on the grounds of corruption. 
Guo is a Chinese billionaire who fled to the 
U.S. in 2014 in anticipation of corruption 
charges following the arrest of former busi-
ness partners.68 In 2015, Chinese media 
ran several stories about Guo’s corrup-
tion, which he claimed were fabrications 
made by political and business opponents 
with vendettas against him.69 In 2017, Guo 
started giving interviews to U.S. media and 
spilling Chinese Communist Party secrets, 
personally calling out former Politburo 
member He Guoqing for his hidden wealth 
and corruption.70 These interviews brought 
negative attention to the possible hypoc-
risy of Xi’s anti-graft campaign; three days 
following the interviews, China submitted 
a Red Notice calling for Guo’s arrest and 
extradition on the grounds of corruption, 
bribery, and rape.71
As previously mentioned, it is not up to 
Interpol to decide the innocence of Guo 
or even to investigate serious charges 
such as rape. The important consideration 
is whether this is a case of pure corrup-
tion or whether Guo should be treated as 
a political dissident. According to Interpol, 
corruption is an ordinary level crime, but 
considering the timing of the events, it is 
easy to see this case in terms of disclosure 
of government secrets instead of pure cor-
ruption. In section 3.4 of the repository, 
titled Offenses Against the Security of the 
State, it states that “a case-by-case basis is 
required to ascertain that the facts of the 
case are purely political in nature… and the 
facts of a political case may include aspects 
of ordinary-law crime which may lead to the 
conclusion that the case is of a predomi-
nantly ordinary-law nature.”72
In instances that involve whistle-blowing, 
such as the leaks by Edward Snowden, 
the cases are unquestionably political 
in nature, and therefore no Red Notices 
are issued. However, in the case of Guo, 
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it can be argued that the nature of cor-
ruption and bribery charges supersede 
the political nature of this case. Despite 
that argument, the timing of the Red 
Notice and the interviews that fingered 
members of the Communist Party supply 
ample evidence that the Red Notice was 
politically motivated. When cases such as 
Guo’s became highly political and the line 
becomes blurred, it would be in Interpol’s 
best interest to deny China’s request for a 
Red Notice.
Overall, the cases related to Xinjiang and 
terrorism seem to present a larger pre-
dicament for Interpol than the cases of 
corruption. The case of Guo Wengui had 
an overarching political component that 
many of the other corruption cases such 
as Operation Skynet lacked. For example, 
the previous number one fugitive on the 
RNS for China was the former vice-mayor 
of Wenzhou, Yang Xiuzhou, who embez-
zled approximately 19 million RMB in funds 
along with 7 million RMB in bribes.73 
Helping China repatriate criminals such 
as Yang through legal methods is the 
purpose of Interpol and member coun-
tries should play their part. Despite the 
fact that many corruption cases do not 
fall under Article 3, the accusations of 
politically motivated Red Notices against 
Interpol forced the organization to issue a 
response in 2016 that strengthened their 
commitment to Article 3.74
Interpol’s Response
Interpol is well aware of the criticisms from 
Western countries regarding abuse of the 
RNS. As mentioned earlier, it is important 
for Interpol to maintain its core values and 
the trust of its member nations, especially 
the countries that are its largest contrib-
utors. In response to complaints about 
the failures of the RNS, Interpol passed 
a new regulation in 2016 to strengthen 
the system’s review process.75 While the 
new resolution did not match the com-
plete overhaul proposed by many human 
rights groups, many aspects of a 2015 
proposal submitted by Fair Trials Inter-
national were incorporated.76
The new resolution explains that Interpol 
recognizes the importance of ensuring 
that data processing in the information 
system complies with Interpol’s rules, 
particularly Article 2 and 3 of the consti-
tution.77 The Commission for the Control 
of Interpol’s Files (CCF) was restructured 
into two chambers. The Supervisory and 
Advisory Chamber will ensure that the 
processing of personal data is in compli-
ance with Interpol’s rules and will provide 
advice on projects.78 On the other hand, 
the Requests Chamber will examine and 
decide requests for access to data and 
corrections or deletions of the processed 
data.79 The resolution also established a 
clear timetable for a review process and 
procedures to provide an effective remedy 
for individuals with regards to data.80 This 
resolution improves upon the previous 
structure by separating the processing 
and review phase into two chambers, and 
by speeding up a possible review process. 
Reviewing all of the cases in depth will still 
be impossible, but it is now significantly 
easier for each country’s National Central 
Bureau (NCB) to report possible violations 
and have them reviewed. This new system 
helped facilitate the review of Dolkan Isa’s 
case, which was overturned in 2018. 
It is worth mentioning that this resolution 
took effect the same year as the election of 
Meng Hongwei to the presidency of Inter-
pol. Interpol is playing a strategic game to 
give China more power in the organization, 
while also adding provisions to prevent a 
large backlash by Western countries. Inter-
pol is pushing back against the possibility 
of abuse of the RNS and safeguarding the 
ideology of the organization that allows it 
to connect police forces across the globe. 
THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS16
Further Considerations:  
China’s Influence on Interpol
Due to the history and structure of Interpol, 
as well as the pushback against abuse of 
the RNS, it is difficult for China to shape 
the rules and norms of the organization. 
However, not only does the system already 
suit China well, but there are three other 
areas in which China notably possesses the 
ability to affect Interpol. 
The first factor is the potential of Inter-
pol’s partnership with the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). In May 2017, Interpol and 
China passed the Declaration of Intent 
on Strategic Cooperation between Inter-
pol and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China which listed 13 points 
of cooperation.81 The document spe-
cifically mentions BRI and the fact that 
China needs to partner with international 
organizations to develop a multilateral 
cooperation platform in all aspects of 
the initiative.82 Interpol pledges their 
policing capabilities and operational 
support to ensure that increased trade 
does not lead to increased opportunities 
for criminals.83 Furthermore, the declara-
tion addresses goals such as enhancing 
worldwide border security for trade and 
travel, protecting vulnerable communities 
from exploitation, promoting integrity 
and reducing corruption, combating illicit 
markets, and adhering to the spirit of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.84 
It is unclear to what extent Interpol will 
play a role in ensuring the safety of BRI, 
but China will appreciate having multi-
lateral support in its efforts to promote 
global trade and infrastructure. One of 
the most prominent influences China 
exerts on Interpol is the continued iso-
lation of Taiwan from membership in 
the organization.
Interpol encompasses almost every coun-
try, but has refused to admit or even 
grant observer status to Taiwan. In 2017, 
Interpol even granted membership to 
Palestine despite resistance from Israel. 
The exclusion of Taiwan means the world 
is missing a critical link in an otherwise 
integrated fight against threats such as 
terrorism and cyberattacks, and the entire 
Taiwanese population is theoretically more 
vulnerable than the populations of other 
countries.85 In 2017, Taiwan hosted the 
Summer Universiade Olympics with over 
9,000 athletes competing from over 170 
countries.86 While everything played out 
smoothly, Interpol did not assist in the 
safety of the event and Taiwan was refused 
access to the I-24/7 database that provides 
countries with up-to-date information 
regarding criminals and crucial informa-
tion.87 Taiwan overcomes these challenges 
through the help of its partners such as the 
United States, but the continued exclusion 
of Taiwan constitutes a blind spot in the 
realm of global policing. While Interpol is 
unlikely to grant membership to Taiwan 
amid the “One China” policy, if Taiwan is 
struck by a high-profile attack that Interpol 
could have prevented, this could become 
a more contentious issue.
The final point of consideration is the 
role of Chinese-created technology and 
how improved policing equipment could 
One of the most prominent influences China exerts on 
Interpol is the continued isolation of Taiwan from  
membership in the organization.
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affect Interpol. China has invested large 
amounts of R&D funds to ensure that 
its policing technology is the most cut-
ting-edge in the world. The use of facial 
recognition and artificial intelligence to 
analyze video evidence, track suspects, 
coordinate responses to emergencies, 
and even prevent crime has the potential 
to alter the way in which global policing is 
conducted.88 China is increasingly storing 
data on each of its citizens and compiling 
data of medical records, travel bookings, 
online purchases, and social media com-
ments.89 China has begun exporting these 
technologies to several other countries, 
including the Citizen Security System 
project known as BOL-110 in Bolivia. As 
these new technologies advance, the 
approach to stopping international crime 
will have to adapt. Interpol could prove 
to be the best forum for China to play a 
role in establishing rules regarding the 
use of new technology on a global level. 
Conclusion
This paper finds that China’s increased par-
ticipation in Interpol has produced both 
progress in its pursuit of domestic goals 
and pushback from other countries and 
human rights groups when it is perceived 
as gaming the system. While countries such 
as China, Russia, and Turkey do use the RNS 
to track down political dissidents, the fear 
of China taking over Interpol is unfounded. 
The European-led top-down structure of 
Interpol and the history of authoritarian 
abuse have led to a system of safeguards 
following the values of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. The passage of a 
resolution that increases the scrutiny of the 
review process and the overturn of Dolkun 
Isa’s Red Notice serve as testaments that 
the core values of the organization remain 
intact. However, despite complications with 
political dissidents, China’s anti-graft and 
counter-terrorism efforts receive a huge 
boost from multilateral engagement with 
Interpol. Red Notices, while not a perfect 
system, are an effective tool to fight crime. 
However, China’s use of extralegal meth-
ods to enhance Red Notices give further 
evidence that the country is not becom-
ing a rule of law nation. Overall, China 
and Interpol have a symbiotic relationship 
kept in check through rule of law countries 
and human rights groups that place pres-
sure on Interpol. Interpol’s involvement 
with BRI, its relationship with Taiwan, and 
its adjustment to new technologies are all 
factors in the China-Interpol relationship 
that will benefit from further research. The 
fallout from China’s arrest of Meng Hongwei 
and the long-term effect on the relationship 
between China and Interpol is another area 
that merits attention. 
Insights on China’s evolving relation-
ship with international institutions can 
be extrapolated from this analysis. China 
acknowledges that, as the world becomes 
more connected through globalization, one 
of the best ways to project its power and 
maintain its security is to increase its par-
ticipation in multilateral institutions. China 
wishes to be seen not only as a great power, 
but also as a responsible one. Even though 
China has the ability to influence these 
organizations in some capacities, many 
international institutions have established 
rules and norms that are difficult to change. 
Multilateral institutions remain a battle-
ground where China will attempt to assert 
its might, but these organizations are not 
as malleable as pessimists might believe.
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Introduction
The reform of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in China is crucial for sustaining 
the country’s economic growth through 
increased productivity and innovation. In 
2013, China’s state sector owned assets 
equivalent to 145 percent of China’s GDP, 
the highest ratio in the world, and almost 
double that of the runner-up, India.1 State 
sector profitability has been consistently 
lower than that of the private sector and 
of foreign funded businesses. Chart 1 on 
page 27 shows that the state sector has 
consistently had the lowest rate of return on 
assets in the industrial sector for the past 15 
years. Chart 2 on page 27 shows that SOEs 
have the highest number of loss-makers as 
a share of the total number of enterprises 
in its ownership category.2 This mismatch 
between the state sector’s significant share 
of assets and consistently low profitability 
demonstrates one of the most challeng-
ing problems that China’s economy faces 
today: an inefficient state sector. This paper 
aims to highlight three problems in the 
Chinese government’s ongoing efforts to 
reform SOEs through a mixed ownership 
scheme. First, private investors’ influence in 
SOEs will be limited by their minority stake; 
second, a more eclectic board composi-
tion makes it harder to reach consensus on 
corporate decisions; and third, ownership 
is becoming less important due to party 
and government influence from outside 
the corporate board. This paper exam-
ines these three problems through a case 
study of the government’s decision to 
welcome private actors to invest in China 
Unicom, one of the country’s largest tele-
communications companies. 
An Inefficient State Sector
The state sector is inefficient primarily 
because of a lack of incentive to compete. 
One reason for this lack of competition is 
that state-owned enterprises can access 
financial resources much more easily than 
private enterprises, and thus SOE fund-
ing comes at the cost of fewer funding 
opportunities for the private sector. SOEs 
have an advantage in obtaining funding 
in two ways. First, they take up an abnor-
mally large share of China’s bank loans, 
because banks expect the government 
to implicitly guarantee those loans.3 
Although SOEs only provided 16 percent 
of China’s employment and less than a third 
of national GDP in 2016, they received 
70 percent of all corporate loans in the 
same year.4 For the same reason, SOEs 
have more favorable borrowing rates. 
According to The Economist, SOEs’ aver-
age annual borrowing rates in the Hong 
Kong bond market fall from 3.5 percent 
to 2 percent, if rating agencies take into 
account the government support and 
guarantees that they receive.5 
A second reason for the state sector’s inef-
ficiency is that the structure of corporate 
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governance in SOEs is not conducive to 
generating competitive behavior. This is 
primarily due to several reasons, all related 
to conflicts of interest between manage-
ment and ownership. First, since promotion 
of the top SOE positions is retained by the 
Communist Party under the nomenklatura 
system, the promotional criteria for SOE 
managers, which frequently involve politi-
cal projects or developmental objectives,6 
do not always coincide with economically 
rational incentives to increase profit or 
productivity.7 Second, a relative lack of 
external supervision and shareholder 
scrutiny over SOEs means that managers 
have substantial discretion over investment 
decisions and compensation policies.8 
This encourages rent-seeking behavior 
and corruption. These problems in Chi-
na’s corporate environment run counter 
to the guidelines recommended by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), which call for 
the state to grant SOEs “full operational 
autonomy” and respect the independence 
and the autonomy of the boards.9 The 
Chinese government acknowledges the 
obstacles that inefficient SOEs pose to the 
need to drive up productivity and growth 
in the economy and has proposed a host 
of policies in response: it has strengthened 
managerial discipline through the anti-cor-
ruption campaign,10 and it placed the first 
major SOE into involuntary liquidation in 
September 2016.11 One of the solutions 
proposed to address the problem of cor-
porate governance currently in progress is 
mixed ownership reform.12
Policy and Procedure  
on Reform
The State Council and the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) issued three documents pertaining 
to mixed ownership reform between 2013 
and 2015.13 No substantial progress on the 
reform had been implemented until after 
all three documents were issued. The first 
is the Decision on Major Issues Concern-
ing Comprehensively Deepening Reforms 
(中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的
决定, zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quan-
mian shenhua gaige ruogan zhongda wenti 
de jueding), which was issued at the Third 
Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in 
November 2013. Among the plethora of 
plans for other types of SOE reform, the 
document promises to allow SOEs “to 
develop into mixed enterprises.”14
The second and third documents were 
issued by the State Council within two 
weeks of one another in September 
2015: Guiding Opinions on Deepening 
SOE Reform (中共中央国务院关于深化国
有企业改革的指导意见, zhonggong zhong-
yang guowuyuan guanyu shenhua guoyou 
qiye gaige de zhidao yijian) and Guiding 
Opinions on Mixed Ownership Reform 
(国务院关于国有企业发展混合所有制经济
的意见, guowuyuan guanyu guoyou qiye 
fazhan hunhe suoyou zhi jingji de yijian). 
The former document focuses not only 
on mixed ownership but also on a whole 
variety of other SOE-related reforms. It 
highlights the importance of mixed own-
ership reform by stating that it is “the most 
significant means to improve the efficiency 
The Chinese government acknowledges the obstacles  
that inefficient SOEs pose to the need to drive up  
productivity and growth in the economy.
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of SOEs.”15 It also specifies the means by 
which non-state firms could participate in 
SOE ownership, including the purchase 
of stakes and convertible bonds. The third 
document is even more specific as it lists 
several SOE-dominated sectors that would 
be able to participate in the mixed owner-
ship reform, including telecommunications, 
natural resources, oil and gas, and nuclear 
energy. It also lists the types of non-state 
capital, including foreign capital, eligible 
for investment in the SOEs.16 However, as 
with most guiding opinions issued by the 
central government, the documents were 
still vague, with details on the procedures 
left to be elaborated in future policies 
issued by ministries and local authorities. 
The procedure for implementing mixed 
ownership reform—abbreviated in Chi-
nese as 混改 (hun gai)—can be condensed 
into two steps. The first step, 混 (hun), is 
to invite a selected group of private inves-
tors to purchase shares from an SOE. 
The State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) and 
the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) first select the SOEs 
that will be subject to reform. The selected 
companies then create plans detailing 
which stakes or business units they will 
put up for sale. SOEs will typically sell 30 
to 45 percent of units such as subsidiar-
ies to private sector partners. The capital 
raised by the share sales typically raise 
more than $1 billion, which are reinvested 
in new projects jointly managed by the 
SOE and its new private partners.17 
The second step, 改(gai), is the implemen-
tation of corporate governance reform and 
increased external supervision as a result 
of the presence and participation of the 
new private investors on the SOE board. 
Unlike retail investors who trade SOE 
shares through public listing for specula-
tive purposes, private investors under the 
mixed ownership schemes are considered 
to be strategic partners who will have an 
active say in how the SOEs are managed 
and in how future projects will be carried 
out.18 This reform therefore aims to not 
only increase funding for SOEs from private 
sources, but also to improve their operation 
and efficiency through allowing private 
investors to play an active role in setting 
company policy. 
The first batch of SOEs to be reformed 
according to the mixed ownership reform 
pilot scheme was approved by NDRC in 
September 2016, a year after the authori-
tative documents were issued by the State 
Council. Nine central SOEs19 including China 
Unicom, China Eastern Airlines, China South-
ern Power Grid, Harbin Electric Corporation, 
China Nuclear Engineering and Construction 
Corporation, and China Shipbuilding Industry 
Corporation were greenlighted to open up 
their businesses units for sale to private inves-
tors.20 A second batch of 10 central SOEs 
was approved in April 2017, covering similar 
sectors and including defense and railway.21 
In July 2017, the government also started 
allowing local SOEs to experiment with 
mixed ownership reform.22 This was further 
confirmed in November when a third list, 
involving 31 more local and central SOEs, 
was issued by NDRC.23 Although the major-
ity of private investors hitherto revealed has 
mainly consisted of large technology corpo-
rations, other sources of private capital have 
also appeared. Chinese private equity firm 
Wealth Capital announced that they formed a 
5 billion RMB ($756 million) investment fund 
in August 2017 that specifically targets SOEs 
undergoing mixed ownership reform.24 The 
NDRC plans to “basically complete” SOE 
mixed ownership reform by the year 2020.25
Challenges to Reform
The rationale behind the mixed ownership 
reforms is that, by increasing the stakes of 
strategic private investors in SOEs, corporate 
governance could be improved by giving 
these private investors a voice on the board 
and allowing them to scrutinize managerial 
performance. However, there are three the-
oretical challenges to this rationale. 
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The first challenge is that private investors 
actually do not, and most likely will not, 
have a majority stake in any SOE under the 
mixed ownership reform scheme. This is for 
two reasons: the first reason is political. It 
is has been made clear by the authorities 
that the objective of introducing mixed 
capital into SOEs is to strengthen the state 
sector. 26 Allowing private investors to hold 
a majority stake in SOEs would constitute 
privatization, and there is no impetus from 
any government or party policy to system-
atically privatize SOEs.27 A State Council 
directive in November 2017 requiring SOEs 
to transfer 10 percent of their shares into 
pension funds is also an indication that 
strong SOEs are integral to the govern-
ment’s long-term plans.28 This solidifies 
SOEs’ importance in the Chinese economy, 
making systematic privatization even more 
unlikely. The second reason why privatiza-
tion will not occur is commercial: SOEs are 
actually quite profitable when one is not 
putting their figures side by side with the 
even more successful private sector. The 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) reported that in 
the first ten months of 2017, profits for SOEs 
(central and local combined) grew by 24.6 
percent year on year.29 It is also import-
ant to remember that the main impetus 
for the “grasping the large and letting go 
the small” (抓大放小, zhuada fangxiao) era 
of mass corporatization in the late-1990s 
was because they were making enormous 
losses. By contrast, the relatively profitable 
position of SOEs today makes it even less 
urgent for the government to grant private 
investors majority stakes in state sector 
firms. It is therefore questionable whether 
private investors with only minority stakes 
are capable of bringing about corporate 
governance reform, some of which will no 
doubt clash with the entrenched interests 
of incumbent SOE managers, many of 
whom are also the major shareholders. 
The second challenge is that the intro-
duction of private investors into Chinese 
SOEs might actually make it more difficult 
for an SOE board to reach a consensus 
regarding future projects and reform. This 
is because inviting private actors into SOEs’ 
ownership and managerial systems further 
complicates the already byzantine structure 
of China’s state sector leadership. There 
are already a host of players and interest 
groups vying for influence in SOEs, includ-
ing the CCP Organization Department’s 
nomenklatura system, whereby the CCP 
controls the appointment of SOE heads, 
SASAC’s nominal ownership of all central 
SOEs, and the MOF, for which SOE profits 
are a substantial source of revenue. SASAC 
and the CCP have strong developmental 
objectives for SOEs, for example to provide 
macroeconomic stability through increas-
ing investments when China’s growth 
slows.30 This clashes with MOF’s objective 
for SOEs to become financially sound by 
being more profit-oriented, which some-
times would mean making investments that 
conflict with developmental objectives. 
It is also difficult to determine whether pri-
vate actors who invest in these companies 
through the mixed ownership schemes 
do so because they see profitable oppor-
tunities or simply because they want to 
influence these SOEs for the benefit of 
their own primary businesses. As is true 
Experts warn that mixed ownership reform in fact  
sucks resources from the private sector,  
depriving the latter of much-needed capital.
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in the Unicom case study, many private 
investors are also peer competitors from 
the same oligopolistic sectors. Experts warn 
that mixed ownership reform in fact sucks 
resources from the private sector, depriving 
the latter of much-needed capital when the 
state sector already has a disproportion-
ately large allocation of resources.31 
For example, it is estimated that 10 trillion 
RMB ($1.5 trillion) is required for private 
investors to have a controlling interest in 
(i.e. own 51 percent of shares) 40 percent 
of all SOEs; this is more money than Chi-
nese public companies have ever raised on 
domestic stock markets (7 trillion RMB).32
The third and perhaps most enduring chal-
lenge that the mixed ownership reform fails 
to address is that the ownership of SOEs 
is becoming increasingly less important in 
China’s current institutional environment. 
This is because the lines between SOEs and 
the private sector are becoming increas-
ingly blurred, with the state exercising more 
influence over companies regardless of the 
nature of their ownership.33 For example, 
although the Third Plenum promised to 
give market forces a decisive role in the 
economy, the CCP’s control over major 
private sector players in the form of party 
committees established above the boards 
of directors implies that the supposedly pri-
vate market forces are ultimately under the 
control of the state. As a result, ownership 
of a company no longer necessarily implies 
having control or a decisive say over its 
operational and managerial decisions. 
In fact, the state may actually increase 
control over SOEs that have undergone 
mixed ownership reform. This is because, 
although inviting strategic private inves-
tors may diversify the board, strong party 
committees in the investors’ own respective 
primary businesses will help the govern-
ment set a more political agenda for the 
SOE’s reform in the name of the party. This 
might be done in lieu of purely private or 
commercial considerations. Mixed owner-
ship reform therefore might not necessarily 
lead to a retreat in the state’s involvement 
in the SOEs, opening up the possibility for 
continued misallocation of resources due 
to state interference.34 
One might think that the increasing blur 
between the public and private sectors 
would pose less of a problem for foreign 
investors, especially wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises that are established without the 
need for joint venture with SOEs. However, 
based on open source information, as of 
late 2017 none in the 19 SOEs in the first 
two pilot batches have openly listed for-
eign investors as participants of their mixed 
ownership plans. The unsurprising reason 
for the apparent exclusion of foreign inves-
tors is that SOEs, especially inefficient SOEs, 
tend to dominate sectors pertaining to 
national security or pillar industries that are 
sensitive to foreign capital. This is despite 
the State Council’s August 2017 release of 
the Notice on Measures to Increase Foreign 
Investment, which reiterated support for the 
role of foreign capital in the reorganization 
of SOEs.35 
Case Study:  
China Unicom
One of the first examples of mixed ownership 
reform is China Unicom’s announcement in 
August 2017 of its sale of 35.2 percent of its 
shares worth 78 billion RMB ($11.7 billion), 
to 14 private investors.36 The investors 
include prominent technology companies 
such as Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, JD.com, 
Life Insurance Company, CRRC Corp, 
and Didi Chuxing.37 Unicom announced 
that its Shanghai-listed unit, China United 
Network Communications Ltd., would be 
used as the platform for these sales. After 
the deal is completed, that unit’s board will 
have 15 people in total: six from the state 
sector (including two from Unicom group), 
four from the new strategic private inves-
tors, and five independent non-executive 
directors.38 This deal is also estimated to 
be the largest capital-raising deal in the 
Asia-Pacific since 2010.39 Unicom has also 
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announced that as one of the first acts of 
the post-deal reform, it will soon consoli-
date its 27 departments into 18 in order 
to remove overlapping functions and cut 
red tape.40
The first challenge mentioned above 
concerning the minority stake of private 
investors is apparent in Unicom’s scheme: 
although Unicom’s ownership of its own 
A-shares will drop from 62 percent to 36 
percent, the state as a whole remains the 
majority stakeholder with 53 percent. The 
largest private investors participating in this 
sale—Tencent and Baidu—will only hold 5.18 
and 3.3 percent of shares respectively.41 
The composition of the new board—with 
private investors only holding four out of 
15 seats—also reflects the private investors’ 
minority position. Perhaps most interest-
ingly, China Life Insurance—which is 70 
percent state-owned—is the largest of the 
new shareholders to participate in this 
mixed ownership scheme.42 It will hold 
10 percent of Unicom’s Shanghai unit, 
almost a third of all the shares offered, 
further increasing the de facto stake held 
by the state. 
The second challenge pertaining to con-
flicts of interests among the strategic 
private investors is also apparent, with all 
three of China’s largest tech firms—Baidu, 
Alibaba, and Tencent (BAT)—involved in this 
deal. The fact that they are rivals in their 
own industry could pose serious problems 
to cooperating and standing up against the 
majority interest of the state.
Unicom’s party secretary and chairman 
Wang Xiaochu gave a speech in Decem-
ber where he defended the decision to 
include peer competitors on the Unicom 
board. Wang argued, rather unconvinc-
ingly, that Unicom would be able to 
“utilize the comparative advantages of 
each private investor without generat-
ing unnecessary friction,” without giving 
any substantial explanation as to how that 
could be achieved.43 
Finally, the third challenge of further blur-
ring the lines between public and private 
capital is also reflected in this deal. The 
party apparatus has a strong presence in 
both Tencent and Baidu, the two largest 
private investors in the deal. Tencent’s party 
committee has more than 7,000 members, 
around 23 percent of all its employees. 
Its party secretary, Guo Kaitian, is a senior 
vice president of the company and has 
been in charge since the party committee 
was established in 2011. Tencent’s deputy 
party secretaries also hold senior manage-
rial posts in charge of cybersecurity, social 
media, and government relations.44 Baidu 
has more than 3,600 party members,45 and 
its party secretary Zhu Guang is also a senior 
vice president of the company in charge of 
brand building, internal communication, and 
marketing.46 However, given that we as of 
yet do not know who will be on the board of 
Unicom’s Shanghai business unit, it is difficult 
to definitively prove that the strength of these 
party committees will impede Tencent and 
Baidu’s potential to improve Unicom’s cor-
porate governance as minority shareholders. 
Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent… the fact that they are 
rivals in their own industry could pose serious problems 
to cooperating and standing up against  
the majority interest of the state.
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Chart 1: Total Profits / Total Assets of Industrial Enterprises



























































































Chart 2: Percent of Loss-making Industrial Enterprises
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Conclusion
It is very difficult to empirically evaluate 
the results of mixed ownership reform 
for two reasons. The first is because this 
is only one of many policies that the gov-
ernment has issued for reforming SOEs; 
others include merging or consolidating 
existing SOEs as well as the creation of 
state sovereign wealth funds.47 This makes 
it challenging to measure the benefits of 
mixed ownership reform while controlling 
for the effects of other reforms. The second 
reason is because non-transparent changes 
that occur behind closed doors due to the 
reform, such as new managerial input and 
improved corporate governance, are hard 
to assess without conducting relevant inter-
views or obtaining inside information by 
other means. It is hard to verify the claim 
that party committees in private compa-
nies exercise influence over their board 
decisions on SOEs unless we know at 
least who the board representatives are, 
for example. 
In conclusion, it is too early to tell whether 
the mixed ownership reforms are suc-
ceeding. The two batches of greenlighted 
central SOEs mentioned above are merely 
pilot projects and only a fraction of those 
greenlighted companies have announced 
concrete plans for selling their stakes. The 
government announced that it aims to 
complete the reforms by 2020, and yet 
as of August 2018 only two-thirds of cen-
tral SOEs have completed the first step of 
allowing private investors to hold shares.48 
The slow pace of implementation, the lack 
of good measures for verifying results, and 
the three conflicting challenges explained 
above mean that mixed ownership reforms 
alone are unlikely to solve the enduring 
challenges that SOEs face today. 
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Introduction
Access to food is one of humankind’s most 
fundamental needs and rights. Population 
growth, natural disasters, climate change, 
and conflict all throw this access into 
question. If we proceed from the stand-
point that international organizations and 
regimes have the potential to assist in 
governing and mitigating problems that 
apply globally, global governance of food 
security is one of the most obvious, primary, 
and pressing areas in which cooperation 
between states is needed. 
From the 1870s onwards, we have become 
a globalized world in terms of international 
food flows. In this context, if a state cannot 
produce sufficient food for its population, 
it can acquire this from abroad through 
aid or trade. Food insecurity arises when 
a state cannot either produce enough 
domestically or access the world market. 
Global governance institutions seek to help 
moderate the volatility of markets so that 
abrupt price changes do not cause harm, 
incentivize states to remove policies which 
distort the availability of food in markets, 
provide freely available information, assist 
with development of agriculture in coun-
tries which struggle with reliable access 
to food, and provide emergency relief aid 
where necessary. 
China presents a puzzle for global food 
security governance. It is not a typical less 
developed country (LDC) beneficiary of 
food security programs—it is in fact the third 
largest contributor to the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO).1 At the same time, it is the country 
with the largest population in the world, 
1.386 billion, making up 18.4 percent of 
world population, yet it only possesses 9 
percent of the world’s arable land, which 
is a hard limitation on its capacity to pro-
duce enough food for its people.2 As more 
and more of its population leave poverty 
and enter the middle class (in 2005, 70.7 
percent of its population lived on less than 
$5.50 per day in purchasing power parity—
the upper middle income poverty line; this 
dropped to 31.5 percent in 2014), demand 
for greater variety and greater animal pro-
tein will be a continuing force in lifting 
demand for different food products.3 As 
of 2017, China was self-sufficient in grains, 
but a net importer of the staples of meat, 
dairy, soybeans, and oilseeds.4 
Given China’s unique food security situa-
tion, this paper seeks to understand how 
China approaches food security as an 
issue for global governance, so as to infer 
how this approach may impact the food 
security of the rest of the world. This paper 
concludes that, while China does engage 
in the main global food security gover-
nance regimes (barring one, the Group of 
Seven) and does so in an active way so as 
to advance its interests, it is not satisfied 
that engaging in multilateral fora alone 
can safeguard a resilient and reliable food 
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supply for its population. Therefore, it also 
pursues strategies outside of these fora, 
with separate food security governance 
arrangements in Asia, Latin America, and 
BRICS, as well as acquiring investments 
overseas of arable land and food produc-
tion facilities (often described as “land 
grabs”). The diversification of strategies has 
the ultimate goal of an extremely resilient 
food supply for the Chinese population.
Food Regimes and Global  
Food Security Governance 
Food regime scholars aim to conceptu-
alize how food flows around the world. 
One of the leading scholars, Harriet 
Friedmann, defines the food regime as 
the “rule-governed structure of produc-
tion and consumption of food on a world 
scale.”5 This definition of governance does 
not require formal rules or international 
agreements. Instead, “implicit rules evolved 
through practical experiences and nego-
tiations.”6 Such negotiations and evolving 
practices eventually bring about “a stable 
pattern of production and power.”7 In 
food regime analysis, a powerful state or 
non-state actor must act as the driver of 
this pattern.
The first food regime was the colonial-dias-
poric food regime, lasting from 1870 to the 
1930s.8 At the time, Britain and other Euro-
pean countries held relative power in the 
world system as colonizers. Industrial pro-
duction was expanding in Europe relative 
to agricultural production. This first food 
regime was hence a set of relationships 
between the European colonizers and 
their colonies, where tropical, livestock, and 
grain products flowed from the colonies to 
the colonizers.9 
The end of the Second World War brought 
about the mercantile-industrial food 
regime.10 As colonial relationships broke 
down, the second food regime centered 
around the United States, which played a 
new role in international food flows. The 
United States exported its agricultural 
surpluses to an “informal empire” of post-
colonial states on the “strategic perimeters” 
of the Cold War.11 Through these flows, the 
United States shored up support against 
Communism and the Soviet Union, dealt 
with surplus production, and ensured that 
food shortages in Europe and other coun-
tries were remediated.
The third global food regime is yet to be 
defined.12 Powers like China, Brazil, and 
India now have a significant impact on the 
flows of food. At the same time, global pro-
duction chains and private corporations 
have begun to play an exceedingly large 
part in the dynamic of the food regime. 
Food production is being increasingly 
disaggregated in such a way that produc-
tion is only coherent from the point of view 
of supply chain managers, in the form of 
transnational commodity complexes. 
What we can surmise is that these global 
supply chains are being managed by both 
Western and Southern (including Chinese) 
multinational corporations.
Global food security governance also fits 
the concept of a regime complex. Regime 
China cannot fully embrace complete trade liberalization 
because of its commitment to a certain level of self-
sufficiency, which is only possible through food reserves. 
Hence, China cannot get all that it wants out of these 
governance arrangements and it has  
to resort to other strategies.
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complexes are defined by Karl Raustiala 
and David G. Victor as “an array of par-
tially overlapping institutions governing a 
particular issue-area, among which there 
is no agreed upon hierarchy.”13 In such a 
regime, states may have trouble achiev-
ing their particular aims “because it is 
difficult—even for powerful states—to exert 
leverage in many diverse fora simultane-
ously and consistently.”14 
It is clear that global food security gover-
nance fits with the definition of a regime 
complex. In a literature review of global 
food security governance, Candel notes 
that the main scholarly critique of current 
food governance is that there is no truly 
authoritative institution.15 Candel states 
that “we observe a regime complex for 
food security, in which food security is 
affected by a wide array of governance 
regimes that are all constituted by distinct 
sets of actors, forums, discourses, interests, 
and so forth.”16 This issue is compounded 
because food security governance touches 
upon diverse issues like agriculture, trade, 
climate change, crisis management, and 
poverty reduction. 
Jennifer Clapp has noted that institutions in 
the economic sphere have more clout than 
others, due to their greater legal weight, 
such as in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).17 States neither want to give sole 
global food security governance responsi-
bility to the WTO, where trade issues may 
come into conflict with resolving food 
security issues, nor give it all to the United 
Nations (UN) system, which is seen as being 
toothless in comparison.18
In terms of the different norms being con-
tested within these regimes, global food 
security governance has been associated 
with free trade since the world began trade 
liberalization in the twentieth century.19 
However, an imbalance persists in which 
developing countries must lower pro-
tections to the point where the cheapest 
option is to purchase foodstuffs imported 
from developed countries, which are 
supported by home government subsi-
dies.20 Countries like China and India have 
pushed back against trade liberalization as 
it relates to food security in institutions like 
the WTO. In the view of the Chinese gov-
ernment, trade liberalization is important 
in that it will create a more efficient inter-
national food market that can better meet 
China’s growing demand.21 However, 
China cannot fully embrace complete trade 
liberalization because of its commitment 
to a certain level of self-sufficiency, which 
is only possible through food reserves.22 
Hence, China cannot get all that it wants 
out of these governance arrangements 
and it has to resort to other strategies. This 
comes back to the essential fact that China’s 
food security is incompatible with a purely 
multilateral approach, in that with multilat-
eralism, everyone is treated the same. For 
China, its own food security will be most 
resilient if other countries largely liberalize 
trade in food stuffs while China is able to 
maintain supports on its own food products 
to safeguard a degree of self-sufficiency.
China’s Role in  
Global Food Security  
Governance Regimes 
China plays various roles in the complex of 
institutions involved in global food secu-
rity governance. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the UN was the first 
effort to globally govern food security when 
it was established in 1944. It was given a set 
of ambitious tasks, including raising world 
nutrition levels, improving food production 
and distribution, and ensuring humani-
ty’s freedom from hunger.23 However, 
the UN’s Ministry of Agriculture lost a lot 
of power in the mid-1970s following the 
world food crisis occurring at the time, 
and has declined in relative importance 
and power since.24 
In the aftermath, the international finan-
cial institutions of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) initially 
took over the duties of global food security 
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move forward in negotiations and finalize 
agreements, it has not been able to fulfill 
its mandate of disciplining trade-distortive 
policies such as agricultural subsidies. Chi-
nese engagement in the WTO as pertaining 
to global food security governance plays 
out in a number of ways. China has subtly 
supported developing countries in their 
fights to retain the right to food reserves. 
China does not lead such efforts because 
to do so would harm its image as a sup-
porter of trade liberalization. However, in 
2013 at the Ninth Ministerial Conference 
in Bali, the G-33 (a coalition of 46 devel-
oping countries that included China) 
tried to remove food reserves from being 
considered in the aggregate measure 
of support, meaning that a food reserve 
policy would not be considered part of a 
country’s subsidy policy. China has been 
especially concerned about the effect of 
speculation on the price of food. In 2009, 
Vice Premier Hui Liangyu stated that “it is 
imperative to enhance financial regulation 
over agricultural markets and effectively 
curb speculative activities.”30
China is not part of the G7, which means 
it does not engage in its food security ini-
tiatives, such as the L’Aquila Food Security 
Initiative (to which $3 billion was pledged 
by the U.S. for a total of $22 billion by donor 
countries),31 the Feed the Future Initiative 
(the U.S. whole-of-government poverty 
and hunger alleviation program), and the 
Global Agriculture and Food Security Pro-
gram (GAFSP). However, the G20 seems 
to have taken over the G7’s role lately in 
global food security governance issues. 
Within the G20, China has tried to put food 
security on the agenda, holding the Meet-
ing of the G20 Agricultural Chief Scientists 
and the G20 Agricultural Entrepreneurs 
Forum in Xi’an in 2016. This involvement 
has increased as China has realized that 
the WTO is becoming less and less effec-
tive (particularly since the failure of the 
Bali Conference) and so has attempted to 
increase its power in the G20.32 It should 
be noted that the G20 clearly excludes the 
other 100 countries which make up the 
governance. These institutions advised in 
favor of market opening measures and cuts 
to state support of agriculture in devel-
oping countries.25 The world food crisis 
from 2007-2008 marked another transi-
tion, acting as a wake-up call for the world 
that other institutions needed to take over 
global food security governance, which 
had only been a peripheral issue for the 
World Bank and the IMF. This led to the 
G7, G20, WTO, and Committee on World 
Food Security (CFS) being more important 
for those following ten years. 
Although the FAO is no longer such a key 
global governance institution, China has 
been increasingly active in it, primarily 
in the form of encouraging South-South 
development cooperation in agriculture, 
presumably to bolster its credentials in the 
South so as to strengthen access to food 
supplies—this will be discussed later on.26
At the World Food Summit in 2009, Vice 
Premier Hui Liangyu concluded his address 
by promising that “China is ready to work 
with the international community to safe-
guard world food security and build a 
harmonious world of enduring peace 
and common prosperity.”27 Despite this, 
because the CFS involves a wide range of 
stakeholders through its civil society mech-
anism (CSM), the lack of plurality in Chinese 
delegates (all quite state dominated) rep-
resents a weakness in China’s ability to 
influence proceedings. Elkin notes that 
countries in which independent civil society 
organizations (CSOs) have positive working 
relationships with their governments have 
greater influence because they arrive with 
common positions and are able to exert 
influence in multiple aspects: through 
CSMs as well as state-only meetings.28
The WTO as an institution of global gov-
ernance has become both less effective 
in determining global trading norms and 
also a less-effective body within global food 
security governance.29 This is fundamen-
tally due to the deadlock that has plagued 
the Doha round—because countries cannot 
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other 15 percent of world GDP, and rather 
more pertinently for food security pur-
poses, a third of the world’s population and 
half of the world’s land area.33 This group 
includes every African country aside from 
South Africa. The G20 also does not include 
non-state actors in its deliberations, such 
as civil society organizations and private 
sector participants. Both groups have a 
great deal to say about and contribute to 
the issue of food security governance, since 
they are directly affected and implicated in 
food security issues. Finally, the G20 lacks 
the expertise and capacity to implement its 
recommendations, since it lacks a formal 
ability to enforce rules. 
China’s Food Security  
Mindset
Food security is a peculiarly pressing issue 
for China for historical and political reasons. 
Historians have estimated that in almost 
every year from 108 BC to 1911 AD, one 
or more province in China suffered a famine 
due to drought or flooding.34 This has gen-
erated a “continuous tradition of thinking 
about famine” and a “cultural mindset” 
obsessed by the threat of hunger. 35 This 
historical setting has engendered some key 
ideas that continue to inform the narrative: 
the paramount importance of self-sufficiency 
in food, and the responsibility of the ruler 
to ensure that there is enough food for the 
people.36 In imperial times, the emperor 
risked losing the “Mandate of Heaven” 
should he shirk his duty to ensure adequate 
food production throughout the empire.37 
This concept has carried through to the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which 
prioritizes grain self-sufficiency not only 
as a matter of national pride, but also as 
a key aspect of political legitimacy.38 Until 
recently, “red lines” for the CCP included 
keeping the stock of arable land at or above 
120 million hectares, as well as achieving 
a 95 percent grain self-sufficiency rate.39 
This did, however, change in 2014 with the 
No. 1 Document which kept the same spirit 
of food security protection, but updated it 
slightly to reflect a more flexible produc-
tion base. The 95 percent rate was replaced 
by a reserve to consumption ratio which 
includes both domestic production and net 
imports, with wording such as “moderate 
imports” showing acceptance of the real 
situation China faces currently.40
Additional aspects that characterize the Chi-
nese outlook on food security are distrust 
of external actors, skepticism regarding the 
West’s approach to food security, and the 
wish for diversification. China also still has a 
third of its population as of 2013 in the rural 
labor force. Policies that support domestic 
food production hence also support this 
large pool of workers, which is desirable.41
Distrust of overseas actors stems from the 
1959 famine, in which China was unable to 
purchase enough grain to feed its people 
due to the U.S. embargo at the time.42 It 
fears being locked out of world markets. 
This is also due to the fact that China con-
sumes such a large amount of grain that 
it cannot help but act in a large-country 
fashion on the world market, driving prices 
up and potentially still not being able to 
meet its needs. In 2016, the FAO released 
a projection of China’s expected net soy-
bean imports in 2025 of 106.1 million 
tons. The average total volume of soybean 
exports from 2015-2017 according to the 
Agricultural Market Information System is 
143.12 million tons, so without a signifi-
cant increase in world production, clearly 
Chinese demand would dominate the 
world market.43 Without expansion, China 
would theoretically stand to import 74 
percent of world soybean exports. Noting 
China’s immense demand, Duggan and 
Naarajärvi state that the international 
market “cannot meet China’s shortfall in 
food production and, therefore, cannot 
ensure China’s food security.”44
The Chinese government is also aware of 
the China threat narrative that Lester Brown 
first promulgated in his book Who Will Feed 
China? and in the past China has boosted 
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domestic grain production as a direct 
result of such accusations, most recently 
in response to the 2008 food crisis.45 The 
structure of world markets and the multilat-
eral institutions is also viewed by the Chinese 
authorities as unfairly biased towards grain 
exporters like the United States. China feels 
that the international food regime is “tightly 
controlled” by these states and their multi-
national corporations, and that as a result, 
reforms always seem to target import tar-
iffs rather than export subsidies.46 These 
concerns have mobilized a desire for diver-
sification in food supply sources in terms of 
regions, channels, and approaches to reduce 
the risk of overdependence. 
The Chinese government consistently men-
tions food security in discourse, which is 
unsurprising given its importance to the 
Chinese people. The general message is 
positive and indicates the idea that China 
is helping the rest of the world in their food 
security as well. For example, Vice Minister 
of Agriculture Gao Hongbin claimed at a 
global summit for food security in 2009 
that China’s food security has actually 
enhanced global food security.47 Chi-
nese state newspapers publish articles 
with headlines like “China’s food security 
fully guaranteed” and “Self-sufficient food 
policy benefits world.”48 Not only does 
China depict things as going smoothly, 
but shows this as predicated upon being 
able to acquire land abroad as well as at 
home. Mindi Schneider notes that these 
discussions begin by citing the “well-worn” 
statistic that China is feeding 21 percent 
of the world’s population on 9 percent 
of its arable land, so as to “communicate 
impending crisis while proposing solu-
tions.”49 China has deemed rice, wheat, and 
maize to be the three “strategic crops” for 
food security, selectively liberalizing other 
crops such as soybeans, but retaining tight 
controls on production, pricing, and imports 
on those staple grains.50
Given China’s unique situation, it is clear 
that Chinese engagement in the institu-
tions of global food security governance is 
aimed at increasing access to international 
food markets while maintaining a high level 
of domestic self-sufficiency in food produc-
tion.”51 Duggan and Naarajärvi state that, 
as China moves from the role of “standby 
player” to “active rule maker,” it will reshape 
the agenda of global governance bodies, 
which historically were not designed by, 
and hence not targeted towards, the con-
cerns of the developing world.52 
Regional Actions
China has taken a leading role in certain 
regional initiatives where it is more capa-
ble of shaping the regime to its preference. 
These include regional grain reserves, new 
food security governance regimes, and 
cooperation forums with the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa), and the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries respectively.53 
China’s affinity for grain reserves is part of its 
resilience strategy. The ASEAN Plus Three 
Rice Reserve is a permanent mechanism 
developed by member countries’ agricul-
tural ministers. The reserve is designed to 
deal with the threat of extreme price vola-
tility or natural disasters wiping out capacity 
in Asia. The reserve holds 787,000 tons of 
rice stockpiled under this arrangement with 
a $4 million endowment fund, mostly from 
the “plus three” who contributed $1 mil-
lion each. This aligns very well with China’s 
domestic policy of strategic reserves. China 
holds the world’s largest grain reserves 
located at the central, local, and provincial 
levels, estimated at over 200 million tons.54 
BRICS countries have started to tackle 
the issue of food security governance 
as a group. At leadership summits, com-
mitments have included the signing of a 
joint declaration on food security, the cre-
ation of the Basic Agricultural Information 
Exchange System of BRICS countries, and 
statements against developed countries’ 
subsidies; in New Delhi in 2012 the group 
stated that “subsidies in agriculture by 
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some developed countries continue to dis-
tort trade and undermine the food security 
and development prospects of developing 
countries.”55 They are working to show the 
world that BRICS countries are determined 
to “play an important role in global initia-
tives on food security.”56
China has formalized engagement with the 
Community of Latin American and Carib-
bean States (CELAC) through the general 
China CELAC Forum. Engagement on food 
security occurs at the China-LAC Agricul-
tural Ministers Forum, which has a focus 
on agricultural development and food 
security. In this forum, China’s actions have 
included establishing a joint 500,000 ton 
food reserve and a $50 million fund for 
eight research and development centers 
in the LAC region.57 China is trying to take 
the initiative in this regional governance so 
as to ensure continued ability to influence 
the important agricultural production coun-
tries in the region. 
Beyond Multilateral Venues
Outside of the regimes covered so far, 
China also deals with food security in a 
unilateral manner. It provides capital to 
foreign countries, particularly in Africa, 
but also Latin America, Asia, and the 
Pacific, which in return allow them access 
to food production. Provision of capital is 
defined through setting up production 
bases, agricultural development centers, 
agricultural research and development 
(R&D) exchanges, and economic coop-
eration arrangements. Daojiong Zha and 
Hongzhou Zhang estimated that by 2013, 
China had set up 60 bilateral agricultural 
or fishery cooperation working groups 
with over 50 countries and regions.58 Also 
by 2013, China had undertaken fishing in 
the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of 
more than 30 countries, and in fact the 
number of “distant water fishing vessels,” 
totaling 1,991, was the most of any coun-
try in the world.59 In 2010, China pledged 
to establish 30 demonstration centers 
for agricultural technologies in other 
developing countries at the UN High-level 
meeting on the Millennium Development 
Goals, as well as to send agricultural tech-
nicians to those countries.60 
Through this, we can see that China tends 
to engage with countries bilaterally when it 
comes to securing food chain cooperation 
deals, rather than through multilateral mech-
anisms. These bilateral deals that help other 
countries increase their food production are 
a win-win situation for everyone: for China, 
because it can feel more confident in the 
greater availability of food to import from 
overseas, and for the recipient countries, who 
are increasing their volumes of production. 
“Land Grabs”
Land grabs involve the aquisition of land 
and food production facilities by one coun-
try in another. Some scholars view them as a 
form of neo-colonialism, while others frame 
them as a natural consequence of the inte-
gration of food production into the global 
economy.61 The Chinese government has 
been active in encouraging Chinese com-
panies in the “go out” strategy to acquire 
investments in grain and meat production 
abroad, including in official speeches. 
Abdenur states that “Chinese state and non-
state actors have come together to boost 
their presence in production, processing, 
and logistics of agricultural commodities 
in other countries.”62
Chongqing Grain Group (CGG) is a prom-
inent example of a Chinese corporation 
with a vigorous overseas investment policy, 
spending millions or even billions to secure 
projects in Canada, Brazil, and Argentina 
in soybeans and oilseeds.63 In Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, China does a lot 
of investing in building infrastructure for 
transporting food, including improving 
transport, logistics, and port infrastructure 
to facilitate exports to China.64 Zhang and 
Cheng agree, stating, “the main task for 
China’s overseas agricultural investment 
lies in establishing a global system for pro-
duction, marketing, transportation, storage, 
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processing and manufacturing.”65 Duggan 
and Naarajärvi, writing in 2015, found that 
China acquired an estimated eleven million 
hectares of land in land grabs in the global 
South.66 Other Chinese agribusiness firms 
with global acquisitions are Beidahuang, 
the China National Cereals, Oils and 
Feedstuffs Corporation (COFCO), and the 
China National Agricultural Development 
Group.67 While the concept of land grabs 
is problematic in that it removes agency on 
the side of the host country and implies that 
China is taking land as opposed to engag-
ing in a mutually agreed upon investment, 
what is indisputable is that these transac-
tions are occurring. What’s more, they are 
inextricably linked to the Chinese gov-
ernment’s efforts to increase world food 
production, because this is inherently ben-
eficial for China’s food security.  
China in the Soybean Complex:  
A Case Study
Soy is a very interesting case study of the 
intersection of global agricultural trade, 
Chinese culture, and Chinese food policy. 
Soybeans originated in northeast China 
(there are 6,000 domestic varieties) and var-
ious soy products, such as tofu, soy sauce, 
and fermented soy products are a domi-
nant dietary and culinary staple throughout 
China.68 Nowadays, the majority of soy 
consumed actually appears in the form of 
industrial meat that is raised with soymeal 
feed.69 Soybeans have hence become Chi-
na’s most important agricultural import.70 
This fits with the worldwide trend in soy 
usage, with only six percent consumed in 
the form of whole beans, tofu, or other soy-
based foods.71 
Soy production has been characterized 
as a global complex. Soy production has 
expanded massively over the last 50 years, 
with world production increasing from 26.8 
million metric tons in 1961 to 285 million 
in 2013.72 This enormous increase in pro-
duction has occurred through the creation 
of soy monocultures in North and South 
America which are being grown for export 
purposes. This was initially controlled by 
Western corporations who managed the 
entire complex from farming to sales of the 
end product.73 
In the 2000s, China started to engage 
more with the soy complex. This occurred 
because the Chinese government liberal-
ized trade in soybeans in the late 1990s and 
began a strategy of importing whole beans 
to then be crushed domestically, which 
included fiscal incentives for foreign direct 
investment in soybean crushing.74 By 1996, 
China became a net soy importer and, by 
2003, became the world’s largest importer 
of soybeans.75 In 2013 China imported 64 
percent of the total global soy trade.76
During the 2004 soybean crisis, the price of 
soybeans plunged, but Chinese purchasers 
who had contracts with U.S. corporations 
were required to fulfill them at the agreed 
upon price, leading to widespread bank-
ruptcy of Chinese crushers and refineries. 
This allowed a massive entry of foreign firms 
into the Chinese refining market to take a 
market share of 80 percent for crushing and 
60 percent for refining.77 Gustavo Oliveira 
and Mindi Schneider note that “this meant 
that the same firms controlling soybean 
exports to China from production centers 
in the U.S. and South America were also the 
major importers controlling the flow of soy 
and soy products through the Chinese food 
system.”78 This situation was problematic 
in that these firms clearly did not have the 
Chinese consumers’ best interests at heart 
(rather they were concerned with profits for 
their shareholders and with gaining market 
power in the world). It also wounded the 
Chinese national pride to have such a 
sensitive national industry become dom-
inated by U.S. corporations. The Chinese 
government felt compelled to recover the 
soy industry from this foreign domination 
and hence gave state assistance to Chinese 
state-owned enterprises to build process-
ing infrastructure.79 This decision in turn 
helped Chinese firms become powerful 
actors in the global soy complex, and they 
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now capture the profits of crushing and 
processing soybeans domestically.
Finally, Chinese demand encouraged Latin 
American countries to engage in export-
driven monoculture at the expense of more 
diversified agricultural production.80 This 
situation compromises the food security 
of the supplying regions. Gustavo and 
Schneider note that monocultures are a 
“contradictory process, whereby a multipli-
cation of uses of a single monoculture also 
reduces the diversity of agro-ecosystems, 
diets, and even cultural practices, ultimately 
increases our collective vulnerability to cat-
astrophic pest outbreaks, price shocks and 
market volatility, and food crises.”81 
The case study of soy provides a valuable 
analogy to China’s overall approach to food 
procurement and security. A victim in the 
past of dependence on Western firms and 
the international institutions through which 
they operate, China has chosen a strategy 
of empowering domestic firms, particularly 
SOEs, to ensure the ability to be self-suf-
ficient—if not in producing soy, then in 
processing it. At the same time, Chinese 
bilateral cooperation with LAC countries, as 
well as in the regional China-LAC Agricul-
ture Ministers’ Forum, has helped it ensure 
good access to the soybean producers, 
including through financial contributions 
to the food reserve and fund for R&D in the 
LAC region. The final illustrative aspect of 
this engagement is the fact that China’s copi-
ous demand in the soybean trade remains 
problematic in terms of global food security. 
We know that a single monoculture in a geo-
graphical region brings with it risks and costs 
to the local population and increases food 
insecurity. China’s search for food security 
endangers the food security of the popula-
tions from which it sources.
 
Future Prospects
We can expect the Chinese government 
to continue pursuing diverse strategies 
to achieve a secure food supply. The G20 
seems to be the favored venue for China, 
and it will continue to engage actively to 
keep food security on the G2O agenda. 
Should breakthroughs in the WTO dead-
lock occur, China will work with like-minded 
developing countries such as India. While 
China will continue to put on an active and 
positive front in the CFS, it is unlikely that 
China will view it as the primary venue for 
pushing their objectives given the plural-
ity of stakeholders which they will judge 
unlikely to accommodate their interests. 
Given the authoritarian turn of the coun-
try under Xi Jinping, it is also unlikely that 
Chinese CSOs and private companies 
will be empowered to freely engage in 
the CFS (or just as likely, that other coun-
tries will view any such engagement as 
speaking on behalf of anyone barring the 
Chinese government).
In terms of regional cooperation, Chinese 
leadership will remain strong. Their part-
nerships in ASEAN, BRICs, and LAC will be 
actively maintained as China believes that 
active cooperation with the global South 
is important in safeguarding food supply. 
This leadership will be backed by eco-
nomic and technical support for agricultural 
China’s search for food security endangers  
the food security of the populations  
from which it sources.
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development.82 Connectivity in the form of 
investment in infrastructure will also be a 
component of China’s strategy. Zhang and 
Cheng posit that through this cooperation, 
“China can reduce poverty, support local 
food security and build a fair and effective 
global food regime.”83
China will continue to be a massive pres-
ence in the soy complex and, should trade 
tensions with the United States continue, 
will actively work with other countries to 
set up soy and other grain production to 
ensure that the supply is protected. This 
is already occurring as Canadian farmers 
respond to trade war threats and alter pro-
duction for an expected increase in demand 
for Canadian crops from China, as well as 
countries including Brazil and Russia.84
Conclusion
The regime complex that governs global 
food security is complicated. No one body 
can discipline nation states to tackle all 
aspects of the drivers of global food inse-
curity. China views itself as a leader of the 
global South, and has tried to engage in 
different venues as its representative, like 
in the WTO. However, acting on behalf of 
developing countries is only a side effect 
of China’s main reason for engagement in 
the global food regime complex—a deep 
and persistent concern about safeguard-
ing domestic food security. Aspects of 
China’s engagement that bode poorly 
for a genuinely multilateral solution 
to global food security are its actions 
securing land and supply chains in other 
countries, which have been characterized 
as land grabs. A more cooperative mul-
tilateral approach to acquiring land would 
be unlikely to work, so to secure these 
supply chains, China must act bilaterally. 
China also has no genuinely free private 
sector or civil society groups to engage 
with on these issues, so it opts for state-
state interactions. These will not provide 
all the answers, since the solution lies with 
a broad spectrum of stakeholders. 
China’s actions in global food security gov-
ernance cannot be understood in isolation 
in terms of one regime or one foreign direct 
investment decision. China is pursuing a 
strategy of diversification across a range 
of approaches with the end goal of resil-
ience. Due to historical distrust and innate 
ideological differences, China will not leave 
the paramount goal of a secure food supply 
to be resolved solely by free markets and 
the multilateral liberal order. Instead, while 
Chinese officials choose to engage with 
these regimes and institutions, they also 
engage directly with regions and coun-
tries that have the ability or the potential 
to grow the total global food supply and 
be of assistance to China. In this frame of 
understanding, China does not see land 
acquisitions or country-specific deals as 
running contrary to multilateral gover-
nance, but rather as a complementary and 
vital aspect of their main strategy.
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Introduction 
Since Xi Jinping rose to power in Novem-
ber 2012, he and the top leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have initi-
ated significant reforms to all three pillars of 
the Chinese polity: the party, military, and 
government. Some of the most sweeping 
reforms are taking place within the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (PLA). At the Third 
Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in 
November 2013, the CCP announced a 
sweeping reform plan which made clear 
that reforms to the PLA were needed.1 
However, the full details of specific PLA 
reforms were not announced until Janu-
ary 1, 2016 with the release of the Central 
Military Commission Opinions on Deepen-
ing the Reform of National Defense and 
the Armed Forces document.2 The most 
important of these reforms include the 
restructuring of offices under the Central 
Military Commission (CMC), the reorganiza-
tion of seven military regions into five new 
theater commands, and service reforms 
including the elevation of the Second Artil-
lery Force to a full-fledged service known 
as the PLA Rocket Force and the creation of 
an entirely new service—the Strategic Sup-
port Force. Through these organizational 
reforms and a number of other defense-re-
lated organizational reforms, Xi Jinping has 
instituted the most sweeping changes to 
PLA and national defense organizations 
since the founding of the People’s Repub-
lic of China in 1949.3
These reforms have been a major focus of 
many recent studies of the PLA; however, 
most of the attention has been focused 
on their impacts on “jointness” between 
PLA services and tightening political con-
trol over the PLA—especially with respect 
to Xi Jinping’s strengthened leadership 
over the command and control structure.4 
While these two impacts of the reforms are 
undoubtedly critical to the present and 
future of the PLA, there is a lack of focus on 
another critical impact of the reforms: their 
contribution to China’s efforts to promote 
military innovation. As such, the purpose 
of this paper is to provide details on three 
newly created groups within the CCP and 
PLA, and to consider their respective 
roles in promoting Chinese military tech-
nology innovation. The three groups in 
question are the Central Commission for 
Integrated Military and Civilian Develop-
ment, the CMC Science and Technology 
Commission, and the Military Science 
Research Steering Committee. In order 
to better understand these organizational 
reforms, this paper places them within the 
broader history and contemporary context 
of China’s efforts to become a science and 
technology superpower, considers their 
potential impact on military innovation, and 
discusses their relevance to U.S. interests.
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China’s Innovation 
Drive in Context
Before discussing the specific details of the 
organizations in question, it is important 
to understand the context behind China’s 
push for military innovation, as well as 
the need for organizational reform. Since 
the early years of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, Chinese leaders have made 
the development of its “strategic innova-
tion system” a priority. Tai Ming Cheung 
defines a strategic innovation system (SIS) 
as encompassing “a national network of 
organizations that interactively pursue sci-
ence, technology, and innovation-related 
activities to further the development of a 
country’s national security interests and 
capabilities, especially related to strate-
gic, defense and dual-use civil-military 
activities.”5 Cheung says that since the 
1950s, Chinese leaders have pursued 
a state-dominated “techno-nationalist” 
approach to developing China’s SIS, with 
varying degrees of intensity and priority 
depending on the nature of China’s exter-
nal strategic environment.6 
China’s techno-nationalist roots date back 
to the 1950s and the early years of the 
People’s Republic, when foreign threats 
led Chairman Mao Zedong to conclude 
that China could not depend on foreign 
technologies for its security.7 But China’s 
current drive to develop its SIS and pro-
mote dual-use science and technology 
(S&T) innovation can be traced back to the 
late 1990s. At that time, Chinese leaders 
perceived a marked shift in China’s external 
security environment as a result of three 
major developments: a global revolution 
in military affairs demonstrated by U.S. 
technological dominance in the Gulf War, 
renewed cross-strait tensions with Taiwan 
during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, and 
the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade.8 Following these 
developments, the incoming Hu Jintao 
administration initiated the drafting of the 
National Medium- and Long-Term Program 
(MLP) for Science and Technology Develop-
ment (2006–2020), promulgated in 2006. 
The MLP emphasized the importance of 
improving China’s capacity for “indigenous 
innovation” (自主创新, zizhu chuangxin).9 A 
core feature of the MLP was its focus on 
developing strategically important dual-use 
technologies, which are technologies that 
have both civilian and military applications. 
The MLP marked a renewed emphasis 
on the techno-nationalist approach, but 
with a distinctly commercial nature that 
was markedly different from historically 
military-dominated techno-nationalist 
approaches.10 
Since the release of the MLP in 2006, China 
has also released a number of other plans 
that seek to promote S&T innovation, 
most notably the Made in China (MIC) 
2025 Plan and the Next Generation Artifi-
cial Intelligence Development Plan. These 
documents detail China’s plans to fund 
and support world-leading S&T innova-
tions. Both documents also emphasize 
the importance of dual-use technologies 
and military-civil fusion (MCF, 军民融合, 
junmin ronghe), discussed below.11 Taken 
together, the issuance of the MLP, Made in 
China 2025, and the Artificial Intelligence 
Xi Jinping has instituted the most sweeping changes  
to PLA and national defense organizations since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
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Development Plan over the past several 
years signifies China’s serious commitment 
to promoting military S&T innovation. And 
the data show that Beijing is backing 
these up with serious money. Government 
funding for Chinese research and devel-
opment (R&D) has increased from just 
$3.1 billion in 1997 to an estimated $40 
billion in 2013, with roughly $5 to $7 bil-
lion of that dedicated to defense-related 
R&D.12 By 2016, the Chinese government 
was spending (in nominal terms) $70.8 
billion on R&D, with much of this helping 
to produce dual-use technologies like the 
Tiangong-2 space station and the world’s 
first quantum satellite, Micius.13
Thus, unlike decades ago, access to fund-
ing is no longer the primary weakness in 
developing China’s strategic innovation 
system and industrial base. Instead, the 
major problem is weak institutional sup-
port and coordination. In 2014, Zhang 
Youxia, former head of the CMC General 
Armaments Department and current sec-
ond-ranked vice chairman of the CMC, 
made clear that bottlenecking problems in 
weapons development are no longer due 
to lack of funding, but instead, “institutional 
systems and mechanisms have become the 
greatest hurdle.”14 These problems have 
historical roots. Following the establish-
ment of the People’s Republic in 1949, 
China imported the Soviet approach to 
defense industrialization, bringing with it all 
of the bureaucratic and institutional weak-
nesses of the Soviet top-down style. China’s 
institutions tend to be overly segmented 
and stratified. The resulting compartmen-
talization requires coordinating committees 
and agencies that are often inefficient and 
prone to bargaining, which creates sig-
nificant challenges to coordination and 
development.15 And as China’s military and 
national security interests have expanded, 
so too have its organizational challenges, 
heightening the need for reform.
New Key Organizational 
Drivers of Innovation
China’s political and military leadership 
appear to be placing a high priority on 
military innovation. But policy guidance 
and heavy government funding can only 
do so much; without needed organizational 
reforms, inefficiencies and coordination 
problems will persist. A number of recent 
organizational reforms suggest that the 
CCP and PLA understand this. In recent 
years, they have made organizational 
reforms a key component of their efforts 
to strengthen China’s strategic innovation 
system and promote military innovation. 
What follows is a discussion of the three 
most important relevant organizational 
reforms that have taken place over the past 
few years. Because these reforms are so 
recent—and to some extent ongoing—it is 
not yet possible to do any post facto anal-
ysis of their impact on improving efficiency. 
As such, the discussion below seeks only 
to trace recent reforms, place them in the 
larger context of China’s military innovation 
efforts, and analyze what impacts they may 
have. In the future, further study will need to 
be undertaken in order to determine what 
actual impact they have on improving mil-
itary innovation. 
The Central Commission for Integrated 
Military and Civilian Development
The most important organization driving 
Chinese military S&T innovation is the Cen-
tral Commission for Integrated Military and 
Civilian Development (中央军民融合发展
委员会, zhongyang junmin ronghe fazhan 
weiyuanhui), which was established in Jan-
uary 2017. The Civil-Military Integration 
(CMI) Commission is the most important 
group analyzed here for a number of rea-
sons. Unlike the other groups studied in 
this paper, the commission is set up under 
the CCP’s Politburo and its Standing Com-
mittee—rather than under the PLA. Perhaps 
more importantly, the group is chaired by Xi 
Jinping himself, giving it the highest level 
of influence and authority.16 Additionally, 
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Wang Huning and Han Zheng—both mem-
bers of the party’s Politburo Standing 
Committee—serve as vice chairs of the com-
mission.17 As will be shown, the importance 
and effectiveness of the CMI Commission 
is largely based on the rank and influence 
of its members. 
The purpose of the CMI Commission is to 
serve as the central-level decision-mak-
ing and deliberative coordinating body 
on major issues relating to the develop-
ment of military-civil fusion, and to unify 
the CCP’s leadership over MCF’s in-depth 
development.18 MCF is a process that seeks 
to combine defense and civilian industrial 
bases to support both military and com-
mercial demands, and also to promote 
greater integration of civilian and military 
resources to support military operations.19 
Some analysts argue that CMI and MCF are 
distinct in that MCF is a Chinese-specific 
concept going beyond broader concep-
tions of CMI.20 Because of this, this paper 
uses the term MCF, except when referring 
to the CMI Commission, which official 
English translations refer to as the Central 
Commission for Integrated Military and 
Civilian Development. 
Military-civil fusion has long been a goal for 
China. It was first raised as an official con-
cept in 2009 by Hu Jintao and elevated to a 
national strategy by Xi Jinping at the Third 
Plenum in 2013.21 In recent years, it has 
become an increasingly important effort 
cross-cutting the party, PLA, and govern-
ment. The efforts towards MCF make sense 
given China’s growing emphasis on the role 
of information in warfare in its most recent 
military strategy.22 Brian Lafferty, Aaron 
Shraberg, and Morgan Clemens provide 
a helpful explanation for why MCF is an 
increasing priority for China and Xi Jinping:
Modern information-based warfare 
has made the development and 
deployment of new, breakthrough 
technologies imperative to a country’s 
ability to stay ahead, necessitating 
a long-term focus on the pursuit of 
technological superiority. In addition, 
the pace of modern technological 
change has dramatically increased, 
such that lagging development 
of advanced S&T capabilities can 
have progressively dire effects on a 
country’s security. Cutting-edge tech-
nology, meanwhile, is increasingly 
compatible with both civilian and mili-
tary applications, enabling civilian-use 
technologies to be adapted or directly 
transferred to military use.23 
Some Chinese analysts predict that as much 
as 85 percent of current technologies 
have civil-military dual use applications, 
providing a significant opportunity to suc-
cessfully employ MCF as a driving force for 
national economic, industrial, and techno-
logical development. 24
But in order to make MCF work, China’s 
leaders have known for years that it will 
require organizational reforms. In 2010, 
the State Council and CMC jointly pro-
mulgated Document 37, which sought to 
create a strategic framework for MCF policy 
related to science and technology devel-
opment. Document 37 lists six broad areas 
of MCF work needing improvement, two 
Some Chinese analysts predict that as much as  
85 percent of current technologies have civil-military  
dual use applications.
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of which relate to inadequate coordinat-
ing mechanisms and the need to deepen 
reform of institutional mechanisms.25 These 
institutional and organizational weaknesses 
reflect the coordination problems within 
China’s strategic innovation system dis-
cussed earlier. 
They also reflect the broader coordination 
efforts that have long plagued Chinese pol-
icymakers in all areas of policy. Despite its 
authoritarian nature, the Chinese system 
is too large to be centrally run; thus, gov-
ernance is significantly fragmented, with 
decision-makers at all levels fighting for 
influence over the policymaking process.26 
To mitigate the negative impacts of this 
fragmentation, Chinese leaders employ a 
number of institutional and organizational 
tools to increase coordination and increase 
efficiency. David M. Lampton refers to these 
as “cross-system integrators,” and lists 
“leading small groups” and committees 
as examples.27 These organizations allow 
leaders to settle disputes which are kicked 
up the hierarchy from lower levels, and they 
also provide leaders with permanent staff 
and resources to address related issues.28
The CMI Commission is a perfect exam-
ple of a cross-system integrator. And as 
previously mentioned, the fact that it is a 
party—not government—commission, led by 
Xi Jinping and two other Politburo Standing 
Committee members, suggests that it will 
likely be successful in this role. Coordination 
committees can sometimes be weak and 
risk-averse, creating additional bottlenecks 
and policy paralysis.29 But with the highest 
levels of authority leading this commission, 
it is unlikely to suffer from these problems. 
Instead, it seems poised to successfully 
drive military innovation and guide overall 
MCF coordination and development.
The CMC Science and 
Technology Commission
The second most important organization 
considered in this study is the Science 
and Technology Commission of the Cen-
tral Military Commission (中央军委科学技
术委员会, zhongyang junwei kexue jishu 
weiyuanhui), which has historically served 
as the PLA’s nexus of civil-military cooper-
ation on defense technological issues. The 
commission is a focus of this study because 
it was reformed and upgraded as part of 
the sweeping PLA organizational reforms 
announced in January 2016.30 Previously, 
there were four departments directly set 
up under the CMC: The General Staff 
Department, General Political Department, 
General Logistics Department, and Gen-
eral Armaments Department. Under this 
setup, the CMC’s S&T Commission was 
not directly under the CMC, but was set 
up at a lower level within the General Arma-
ments Department (GAD, 总装备部, zong 
zhuangbei bu), which was the PLA’s chief 
organ in charge of performing research, 
development, testing, and evaluation of 
armaments; overseeing procurement 
management; and overseeing information 
systems building for the PLA.31
Under the new CMC setup, the GAD was 
renamed the Equipment Development 
Department (EDD, 装备发展部, zhuangbei 
fazhan) and the S&T Commission was spun 
The PLA acknowledges that the incorporation of AI into 
weapons and military technology is likely to radically 
transform the nature of combat and national defense.
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off to become one of the 15 new organs 
directly under the CMC. This puts the S&T 
Commission on an equal administrative 
rank as the EDD and the other organs 
under the CMC. According to Wuthrow and 
Saunders, “The commission will continue 
to be responsible for guiding and advising 
PLA leadership on weapons development 
and serving as a nexus for collaboration 
between the armed forces and defense 
industry.”32 The specific details of the divi-
sion of labor between the EDD and S&T 
Commission does not appear to be known 
yet, but their respective names suggest that 
the EDD will focus on maintenance and 
administration of China’s procurement 
system, while the commission will be the 
PLA’s internal driver of S&T innovation and 
military-civil fusion.
Based on the commission’s leadership, 
it appears to be poised for success. The 
director of the commission is Liu Guozhi, 
who previously led the commission when 
it was set up within the GAD. Liu is a tech-
nical expert, not a career bureaucrat. He 
graduated from Tsinghua University, one 
of China’s top schools, and led a career 
through the PLA’s weapons development 
system. He was previously a physicist work-
ing on high-power microwave weapons at 
the Northwest Nuclear Technology Insti-
tute, a key lab in charge of Chinese nuclear 
weapons research and the development 
of other high-power technologies.33 Liu’s 
background indicates that the commis-
sion will be led by someone with technical 
knowledge and a deep understanding of 
China’s strategic innovation system. Addi-
tionally, at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, 
Liu became a member of the CCP’s central 
committee, making him one of the high-
est-ranking political leaders in China. Taken 
together, Liu’s technical background and 
political status suggest the S&T Commis-
sion is poised to play an important role in 
strengthening military innovation.
Overall, the upgrading of the S&T Com-
mission from an organ under the GAD to 
a commission directly responsible to the 
CMC reflects the high priority that the PLA 
leadership places on military S&T inno-
vation.34 And the selection of Liu Guozhi 
as head of the commission shows their 
commitment to providing the necessary 
organizational authority to—in theory—
effectively drive innovation. In the same 
way that the party’s CMI Commission was 
set up to overcome structural bureaucratic 
issues and facilitate better coordination, the 
upgraded CMC S&T Commission should 
provide the PLA with enhanced organiza-
tional capacity to innovate and develop its 
strategic innovation system.
The Military Science Research 
Steering Committee
The third and final organization considered 
in detail is the secretive Military Science 
Research Steering Committee (军事科学
研究指导委员会, junshi kexue yanjiu zhidao 
weiyuanhui), a new agency that reports 
directly to the CMC. However, the details of 
this setup are unclear, as it is not one of the 
15 administrative organs under the CMC. 
Instead, reports suggest that the committee 
will report directly to the CMC in a separate 
manner, providing a “consultative role,” 
while the other 15 CMC organs handle 
the funding and implementation of proj-
ects.35 This organization was secretly 
created in early 2017 and announced 
publicly in July 2017 in a CCTV documen-
tary entitled “Carrying Reform Through 
to the End” (将改革进行到底, jiang gaige 
jinxing daodi).36 Few details about the 
agency have been made public, but 
reports suggest that it is envisioned as 
a Chinese version of the U.S. Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), a U.S. defense agency set up 
in 1958 to drive technological innovation 
for the U.S. military.37 DARPA is famous 
for producing some of the world’s most 
important technological innovations, such 
as the internet, which have applications 
outside of traditional defense applica-
tions. If this agency is indeed similar to 
DARPA, it will likely focus on driving the 
development of advanced technologies 
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that have both military and commercial 
applications, further supporting China’s 
efforts towards military-civil fusion.38
One technology that the agency may focus 
on is artificial intelligence (AI). The prom-
ulgation of China’s previously mentioned 
Next Generation AI Development Plan 
demonstrates the high priority that Chinese 
political and military leaders place on the 
development of AI. The PLA acknowledges 
that the incorporation of AI into weapons 
and military technology is likely to radically 
transform the nature of combat and national 
defense. Military writing on AI makes it clear 
that the PLA is committed to the idea that 
incorporating AI into the military will allow 
the PLA to be smaller, more efficient, and 
more effective.39 And, AI will, of course, also 
have huge non-military commercial appli-
cations. In fact, an expert at the Chinese 
Academy of Engineering has said that AI 
will be the most important dual-use tech-
nology of the next several decades.40 If the 
Military Science Research Steering Commit-
tee does, in fact, serve a similar function to 
DARPA, it seems very likely that it will focus 
heavily on the development of AI technolo-
gies.In terms of organizational reforms, the 
Military Science Research Steering Commit-
tee seems to be markedly different from 
the two previously discussed groups, which 
were created in order to comprehensively 
oversee and coordinate defense innova-
tion bureaucracies. As a party group, the 
CMI Commission is tasked with overseeing 
overall national MCF coordination, and the 
CMC’s newly upgraded S&T Commission is 
set up to oversee high-level MCF coordina-
tion from within the PLA. This new agency, 
however, will likely focus less on bureau-
cratic coordination and more on strategic 
technology guidance. That is, it will likely 
be focused on designating key military 
technologies, identifying new technology 
innovators in the commercial sector, and 
connecting these nascent technologies to 
the PLA’s defense innovation network.41 In 
this way, the new agency will help to drive 
bottom-up technological innovation for the 
defense sector.
In short, these three organizations serve a 
variety of roles and represent significant 
advances in China’s capacity to innovate. 
The party’s new CMI Commission, with Xi 
Jinping as its leader, will have the power 
to more successfully coordinate overall 
national MCF efforts, removing key bureau-
cratic coordination weaknesses identified 
by China in 2010. The CMC’s newly pro-
moted S&T Commission will solve some 
of the same bureaucratic and coordination 
issues within the PLA. And the new Military 
Science Research Steering Committee will 
play a new role in identifying early-stage 
technologies for the PLA, driving bot-
tom-up military innovation in a system that 
has historically been heavily top-down. 
But much is still unknown about these 
groups, the latter two in particular. As new 
information becomes publicly available, 
future research should seek to find out 
more about their specific roles, how they 
interact with each other, and whether or not 
they appear to be successful at improving 
coordination and promoting military inno-
vation. In particular, more information is 
needed regarding the specific role of the 
Military Science Research Steering Commit-
tee. Because of its likely bottom-up focus, 
this agency seems poised to play a unique 
role in military innovation. 
Additional Groups for 
Future Consideration
These three organizations are not the 
only organizations playing a role in 
military S&T innovation within China’s 
massive party-state-military apparatus. 
They were chosen for this study because 
they represent the three most significant 
developments in recent years. But other 
organizations are worth mentioning here 
as well, and warrant further study. 
First, the CMC’s newly reformed Equipment 
Development Department (briefly men-
tioned above) plays an important role in 
the PLA’s weapons research, development, 







 vol 5  | 2019
and procurement. It was not included in 
the limited scope of this study because 
the functions of its predecessor, the Gen-
eral Armaments Department, were largely 
retained through the 2016 reforms. The 
spin-off and promotion of the CMC Science 
and Technology Commission thus repre-
sented a more significant development in 
overall organizational reform with regard to 
S&T innovation. However, as the PLA con-
tinues to implement the 2016 reforms, new 
developments relating to the EDD should 
be studied further.
Second, two other important organiza-
tions that play a role in China’s military 
S&T innovation bear mentioning. The State 
Administration for Science, Technology and 
Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), 
situated within the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology, has played a 
role in developing and managing China’s 
defense industrial base. However, since its 
creation as part of a State Council reorga-
nization in 2008, the SASTIND has become 
less important as other organizations like 
the EDD have taken on a greater role.42 
Last, the National Science and Technology 
Leading Group plays a key role in coordi-
nating numerous government ministries 
and agencies in devising national S&T 
strategies and policies.43 The group, led 
by Premier Li Keqiang, recently removed 
“Education” from its name, reflecting an 
increased focus on S&T development. 
Given that Liu Guozhi, Chairman of the 
CMC Science and Technology Commission, 
is a member of this government leading 
group, it is likely that the group will play 
some role in promoting military S&T devel-
opment.44 However, it was not a focus of 
this study because military innovation will 
only be a part of its larger focus.
Conclusions and Broader 
Implications
China’s capacity to innovate has long 
been an important priority for its leaders, 
and through heavy government funding 
and policy support, China appears to be 
making some progress in this area. A 2017 
report by Scott Kennedy at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies 
concludes that, “whether one looks at 
China in isolation or puts the country in 
comparative perspective, China’s innova-
tion performance has gradually improved 
over the last decade along a number of 
indicators.”45 While significant problems 
remain for China’s innovation efforts, Xi 
Jinping’s organizational reforms, which 
span party, military, and government, 
seem poised to aid China in pursuing its 
S&T development goals. Xi and the rest 
of the CCP leadership seem committed 
to embracing the techno-nationalist mold 
for developing China’s civilian and military 
tech industries, and they are undertaking 
the necessary policy and organizational 
reforms to achieve their goals. 
But China’s S&T innovation efforts do not 
exist within a vacuum: they are already 
having an impact on U.S.-China relations. 
In the past several years—especially during 
the presidency of Donald Trump—strategic 
and economic competition between the 
United States and China has increased 
significantly, with science and technol-
ogy competition emerging as one of the 
greatest sources of tension between the 
two countries. In the United States, lead-
ers worry that China’s innovation efforts 
are rapidly chipping away at America’s 
existing technological edge, especially 
in defense-related areas. For example, a 
September 2018 report by the U.S. gov-
ernment called for the United States to take 
serious action to rebuild its defense indus-
trial base. China’s defense industrial base, 
and the challenges it poses to the United 
States, were major themes of the report.46 
Such discussions about long-term efforts 
to rebuild the U.S. defense industrial base 
come as the Trump administration is also 
taking aggressive action against China in 
the near-term to thwart Chinese technology 
innovation. In April 2018, the U.S. Com-
merce Department placed an export ban 
on Chinese telecom giant ZTE, temporarily 
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crippling the company and making clear 
China’s serious vulnerabilities to its lead-
ers.47 Months later in October 2018, the 
U.S. Justice Department accused Chinese 
chipmaker Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit 
Co. of stealing U.S. technology, and the 
Commerce Department banned the com-
pany from purchasing chip components 
from U.S. firms.48
These episodes demonstrate how critical 
science and technology will be for both 
countries going forward. If U.S.-China 
competition continues to increase, both 
countries will likely double down on their 
efforts to innovate. China, over the past few 
years, seems to be already doing this. Xi 
Jinping’s organizational reforms appear 
to have established stronger and more 
diverse organizational support for its stra-
tegic innovation system, which will likely 
provide future innovation dividends. But 
this approach is heavily state-driven. The 
U.S. system is markedly different: it owes 
its existing innovative edge to a market 
economy—albeit with some government 
support. But to compete with China in the 
realm of S&T innovation, the U.S. govern-
ment will need to find ways to maximize 
its innovative strengths. President Trump’s 
recent executive order on AI, along with 
the U.S. Defense Department’s AI strategy, 
appear aimed at doing just this.49 But U.S.-
China technological competition is still in 
the early stages. In the twenty-first century, 
long-term competition between the United 
States and China may hinge on which coun-
try can successfully win the innovation race 
and lead in the technologies of the future. 
China clearly recognizes this fact, and 
is acting to shore up its strengths. If the 
United States wants to maintain its edge 
and compete successfully with China, it 
must do the same.
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Introduction
Over the past twenty-five years of China’s 
economic rise and expanding influence, 
politicians, business leaders, and econo-
mists have questioned whether China is 
capable of innovation. In more recent years, 
this issue has taken on even greater signifi-
cance. From the perspective of the United 
States and other advanced economies, Chi-
na’s progress in high-tech fields threatens 
their hold on innovation-based industries 
and economic power. This has been true for 
some time, but plays a larger role now in the 
context of the ever-escalating U.S.-China 
trade dispute. From China’s perspective, 
new economic realities and a domes-
tic growth model that is shifting towards 
consumption-driven growth mean that 
innovation, and the productivity increases 
it fuels, must now become the key driver 
of the economy. The country has swiftly 
entered middle-income status, with higher 
wages and slower growth rates, and is seek-
ing to upgrade to, and ultimately converge 
with, high-income nations through innova-
tion. Xi Jinping and the rest of the Chinese 
leadership have gone all-in on this strategy, 
but the underlying question remains—can 
China successfully transition into the ranks 
of the world’s innovation leaders?
This paper’s answer is a resounding yes, 
albeit with a few caveats. This assessment, 
far more bullish than most, is centered on 
China’s impressive innovation track record 
to date, and the strengths and early results 
of its upgrading efforts. In 2018 alone, 
rather than rely on the loose, often cul-
ture-based predictions of the past, we can 
observe substantive empirical evidence 
of innovation successes and their broader 
economic impact in China. We are also 
able to analyze the economic policies that 
underlie this transition as well as their ini-
tial outputs in innovative, next-generation 
sectors like artificial intelligence (AI). 
There will be barriers, as well as broader 
structural constraints, that will shape Chi-
na’s ultimate future economy. But these 
issues and considerations aside, the take-
away remains—China is well on its way to 
becoming a leader in innovation, and its 
plans for a full-scale transition are making 
headway. As the McKinsey Global Institute’s 
(MGI) Jonathan Woetzel, an expert on the 
topic, succinctly states, “China’s got what 
it takes.”1 
Progress on Innovation
“Anyone who says that China is not 
innovative or entrepreneurial is kidding 
themselves,” an Amazon employee in 
China recently proclaimed.2 The staid 
conventional wisdom that China simply 
cannot innovate must be rebutted for 
two reasons. One, it mistakenly conflates 
pure invention with innovation, missing 
its underlying importance; two, it relies 
on a 1990s-esque image of the Chinese 
economy that revolves around fake prod-
ucts and copycat businesses. 
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For China, as for all countries, innovation 
is critical because of its potential pos-
itive economic effects on productivity, 
value added, employment, and overall 
upgrading. It need not be “breakthrough” 
innovation to be successful in this regard. 
As The Economist explains, “the proof of 
successful innovation is the ability of com-
panies to expand revenue and raise profits,” 
and Chinese firms have certainly managed 
to do that, as will be seen below.3 Intro-
ducing new technologies or processes, 
regardless of the source of their creation, 
also raises productivity and, ultimately, 
economic growth. This is the core tenet of 
the innovation-driven economy concept. In 
China’s case, further advances (and their 
application) in computing, AI, and robot-
ics will boost productivity. These advances 
could add an estimated $450-780 billion 
of value each year in manufacturing and 
$500 billion to $1.4 trillion in the services 
sector.4 To make a simplified historical 
comparison, Japan was not the first to 
make cars or semiconductors, but it used 
new manufacturing processes, manage-
ment practices, and supportive policies 
to become competitive with the original 
producers in the industries, propelling 
the country to the top tier of wealthy 
nations. From this perspective, China’s 
goal of sustainable growth through inno-
vation seems more within reach, whether 
they invent the world’s next semiconduc-
tor or iPhone or not.
Regarding the second point—that China 
is only good at copying others—there 
is a growing consensus that China 
has developed its own core strengths 
in certain types of innovation, mostly 
within the last five to ten years and 
mostly focused on commercialization.  
The oft-cited MGI report, The China 
Effect on Global Innovation, groups Chi-
nese innovation in the two categories of 
“improving consumer products and the 
business models used to sell them,”5 and 
“making manufacturing processes cheaper, 
quicker and better.”6 China’s broader 
internet sector offers the best example 
of the first category. As MGI describes 
it, “nowhere have Chinese entrepreneurs 
shown a greater flair for innovation than in 
internet-based businesses.”7 China’s tech 
powerhouses, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent 
(collectively known as BAT), have skyrock-
eted to the list of top companies in the 
world through real business model inno-
vations, rather than just “copycat” models 
and government protection. 
The first innovation relates to their custom-
er-facing offerings; they have pioneered 
the idea of super-apps, or platforms, where 
“dozens of different services or sub-apps 
come together.”8 Second, China has devel-
oped related revenue-generating models. 
While most U.S. firms rely on advertising 
to monetize their users, BAT and others 
have successfully developed other reve-
nue sources. Tencent’s WeChat, the prime 
example of both, is a social media, mes-
senger, and mobile payment app in one. 
It relies on game sales, e-commerce, and 
transaction fees.9 It is hard to consider Chi-
na’s mobile payment commercialization a 
business model innovation. However, Chi-
nese firms adapted the QR code, originally 
There is a growing consensus that China has developed 
its own core strengths in certain types of innovation, 
mostly within the last five to ten years and mostly  
focused on commercialization.
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developed in Japan for the automotive 
industry, to making payments via smart-
phones.10 These transactions were worth 
just 1.2 trillion RMB in 2013 but are now 
expected to total 98.7 trillion RMB (roughly 
$15.5 trillion) for 2017, with estimates rising 
even more in the coming years. These fig-
ures dwarf the U.S. and all other major 
advanced markets combined; consumers 
in China now make mobile payments 50 
times more often than Americans.11
China’s tech market is still not on par with 
its U.S. counterpart, but it is rising quickly. 
According to analysis by The Economist, 
China’s tech sector was 42 percent as 
powerful as the United States’ as of early 
2018, up significantly from just 15 percent 
in 2012.12 Looking to the future, “China’s 
unicorns, a proxy for the next generation 
of giants, are in total worth 69 percent of 
America’s, and its level of venture capital 
(VC) activity is 85 percent as big as Ameri-
ca’s based on money spent since 2016.”13 
Tencent and Alibaba play a large role in 
supporting these new firms, funding about 
a quarter of venture deals and growing the 
broader ecosystem. A recent Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
report on the sector states that, “many 
innovative and vital internet companies 
have emerged, playing an important role 
in promoting stable growth and employ-
ment, and benefitting the people.”14
In the second category of innovation that 
has developed in China—cheaper, faster, 
and better manufacturing—the wind and 
solar energy sectors stand out as good 
case studies. After years of “good enough” 
production in traditional industries, China’s 
low-cost model is upgrading to rapidly 
speed up design and scale, and improve 
products for both Chinese and export 
markets at the same time.15 “Chinese com-
panies have shown that they can move from 
idea to commercial product or service in 
far less time than companies in other mar-
kets,” including through much quicker 
prototyping, shorter product cycles, and 
a focus on customer feedback.16 In the 
renewables sector specifically, Jonas Nahm 
and Edward Steinfeld describe a unique 
“innovative manufacturing” process that sits 
“at the intersection of upstream R&D and 
manufacturing.” 17 Chinese firms innovate 
at this juncture on processes, inputs, and 
even the final product, to commercialize 
new-to-the-world technologies.18 This is 
often done with global partners that are 
the original owners of the idea or concept, 
but the authors’ on-the-ground interviews 
indicate that the Chinese role goes “well 
beyond traditional emulation and assem-
bly, reaching deep into new product and 
process design.”19 This has translated into 
remarkable commercial performance, with 
China accounting for 60 percent of world 
solar production and playing a leading role 
in wind turbine manufacturing, as well. This 
is similar to the stories in other high-end 
manufacturing sectors. DJI dominates the 
global commercial drone market, now con-
trolling 85 percent of production. Huawei 
has transformed into a major global player 
across information and communications 
technologies (ICT). It is set to play a decisive 
role in the coming 5G wave. 20 Economi-
cally important, these firms are operating 
throughout the value chain, including in the 
China’s tech powerhouses ... have skyrocketed to the 
list of top companies in the world through real business 
model innovations, rather than just “copycat” models  
and government protection.
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high value-added early stages of design 
and development and later stage of sales 
and marketing.21 
Finally, in assessing recent progress, it 
should also be acknowledged that China 
has shown increased indications of the 
more frontier-type of innovation. China 
has the two fastest supercomputers in the 
world and 202 of the world’s top 500. The 
leader, TaihuLight, is more than five times 
faster than the U.S. top performer, and 
it uses Chinese processors, rather than 
Intel chips. 22 
China has also developed the world’s first 
quantum satellite, Micius, which has scored 
a number of pioneering achievements, 
including the first quantum-encrypted sat-
ellite video call.23 In biotech, another key 
breakthrough field, Chinese firms have 
excelled at genome sequencing.24 These 
are a few cases and should not be taken 
to mean that China now competes head-
to-head with the scientific power of the 
United States. But they may be harbingers 
of things to come. “At least parts of Chinese 
industry,” Nahm and Steinfeld conclude, 
“have reached a new stage of competitive-
ness, one situated at the frontier of global 
technology development, and deep within 
global innovation networks.”25
Realizing an  
Innovation Economy
Moving broader segments of the economy 
towards the technology frontier is now the 
linchpin of China’s development strategy. 
The central government and provincial 
governments are utilizing forceful industrial 
policies and massive financial support “to 
speed up China’s technological catch-up 
and to leapfrog stages of technological 
development.” 26 These efforts are aided 
by a stronger position and role of private 
firms than in past periods in Chinese his-
tory, including BAT, countless start-ups, and 
venture capital (VC) investors. Their com-
bined strengths and potential are already 
having an impact, propelling China away 
from its middle-income peers in next-gen-
eration sectors expected to drive the global 
economy in the coming decades. “A tech-
nology revolution is sweeping the world,” 
Eurasia Group president Ian Bremmer 
proclaimed, “and the countries that most 
effectively seize the opportunities it creates 
will dominate the 21st century.”27 China 
seems to be seizing that opportunity.
The Chinese government has created 
a slew of economic and sector plans to 
achieve their goals. This includes Made 
in China 2025 (MC2025), its well-known 
blueprint for manufacturing modernization 
that became a sticking point in the trade 
conflict with the United States. Other key 
plans include the Guidelines to Promote 
National Integrated Circuit Industry Devel-
opment and Internet Plus plans, and the 
2017 Next Generation Artificial Intelligence 
Development Plan. These plans have spe-
cific production targets, as well as broader 
objectives in automation, supply chain 
localization, promotion of national champi-
ons, and productivity gains. Some notable 
production targets include producing 70 
percent of “basic core components” for 
China has the two fastest supercomputers in the world 
and 202 of the world’s top 500. The leader, TaihuLight,  
is more than five times faster than the U. S. top performer, 
and it uses Chinese processors, rather than Intel chips.
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aerospace and electronics, 40 percent of 
mobile phone chips, 70 percent of indus-
trial robots, and 80 percent of new energy 
vehicles (NEV) within China by 2025.28 To 
realize these goals, governments will mar-
shal billions of dollars of public financing 
through subsidies, specific funds, and bank 
lending; support foreign acquisitions for 
technology transfer and domestic merg-
ers for consolidation; and use a range of 
competition and procurement policies 
to promote domestic players over for-
eign firms.29 National-level funds include 
the Advanced Manufacturing Fund, the 
National Integrated Circuit Fund (also 
known as the Big Fund), and the Emerg-
ing Industries Fund. There is a plethora of 
provincial-level funds as well. At the end of 
2015, there were 720 of these funds with 
assets of $328 billion, numbers that have 
likely gone up since.30 
“China is pulling ahead because it has a 
strategy to build a high-tech economy and 
is willing to spend heavily and consistently 
over years,” James Lewis from CSIS sum-
marized.31 The strategy is forward-looking, 
focusing especially on nascent industries 
not yet dominated by the OECD nations. It 
is supported by both theory and empirical 
successes.32 Every country that converged 
with high-income nations in the post-war 
period, including but not limited to the East 
Asian Tigers, utilized some form of state 
policy for technological development.33 As 
Chinese policymakers point out, even the 
United States employed significant gov-
ernment intervention for infant innovative 
fields, helping to give rise to Silicon Valley 
today.34 China is undoubtedly using much 
more heavy-handed interventions than the 
United States ever did, causing some to 
decry the Chinese plans as neo-mercan-
tilist.35 It may not be the most efficient or 
equitable economic approach, but this is 
no less reason to take it seriously. 
Moving from strong potential to real-world 
results, China’s progress in next-genera-
tion sectors further supports the overall 
conclusion that China will transition into 
an innovation-driven economy. Prime 
among them is AI, which will drive further 
developments in both new and traditional 
industries. In AI, as opposed to most tradi-
tional industries, China has surpassed the 
rest of the world and is competing directly 
with the United States. This leapfrogging 
has been supported by government efforts, 
flourishing private sector activity, and Chi-
na’s clear advantage in the data needed to 
train AI algorithms. “The size of available 
datasets is the most important source of 
competitive advantage in AI,” 36 and Chi-
na’s resulting advantage in that regard will 
be insurmountable for other countries. 37 
The report also categorizes four types of 
AI and China’s performance in each. In 
internet AI, focused on new-age operating 
systems and elsewhere, BAT are competing 
well with their U.S. counterparts, despite 
Google’s current AI global dominance. 
In business AI, China notably lags due to 
slower implementation of earlier data and 
enterprise applications, but 4th Paradigm 
stands out as a global player providing AI 
for financial institutions. The third type the 
authors identify, perception AI, is where 
China really shines. They appear to be a 
global leader in cutting-edge face and 
voice recognition, with firms like Face++, 
iFlyTek, and SenseTime, recently named the 
most valuable AI firm in the world at $3 
billion.38 Lastly, in autonomous AI, China is 
catching up and could ultimately be on par 
with the United States, they posit, in areas 
like autonomous vehicles, robots, and con-
nected things. Importantly, AI seems to be 
providing an opportunity for China’s semi-
conductor industry to also make progress, 
after years of slower progress. Cambricon 
and Bitmain are examples of Chinese firms 
that could jump into competitive posi-
tions in niche chip markets.39 With these 
developments, and its impressive perfor-
mance in three out of four AI categories, 
the government’s goal to catch up on AI 
technology and applications by 2020 and 
become the leading AI hub by 2030 must 
be considered within reach. Former Alpha-
bet chairman Eric Schmidt notably expects 
China to overtake the United States in AI 
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as early as 2025, besting the government’s 
target by five years.40 China’s AI progress 
indicates that it is well on its way to realiz-
ing the potential trillion-dollar productivity 
gains from future sectors.
China’s performance in two other next-gen-
eration sectors is also worth mentioning. 
In vehicles, China is taking advantage of 
timing. Anand Shah, a senior advisor with 
the Albright Stonebridge Group, recently 
explained that two trends—electric vehicles 
and autonomous vehicles—are shaking up 
what was a stable, decades-old model for 
incumbent automakers. This change initially 
caught U.S. firms flat-footed, while the Chi-
nese, driven by BAT and other firms, have 
acted swiftly in developing production 
and spurring demand.41 China could skip 
the painstaking process of trying to gain 
ground in the crowded traditional indus-
try and move right into a strong position 
in the next wave of vehicles. In robotics, 
China is still behind the global curve, but 
is rushing to catch up. They are by far the 
largest market in the world, spending $10 
billion annually to install some 600,000 
total robots to meet the MC2025 targets. 
Provincial governments have especially 
thrown their weight behind the industry. 
Both of these new-age sectors would be 
propelled by further AI advancement in 
the country, adding to the potential of a 
breakthrough, catching-up moment. 
Barriers and Constraints
Despite all of its progress and future 
potential, there are both weaknesses in 
China’s efforts and larger issues that will 
affect its transition to an innovation-driven 
economy. Many of the barriers are politi-
cally related. This includes the top-down 
nature of its upgrading plans, which do 
not necessarily meet firm-level needs 
or demand. Much of the spending flow-
ing from these plans will be inefficient, 
leading Scott Kennedy of CSIS to claim 
that, “these are fat years for innovation in 
China.”42 There is also an argument to be 
made that a strong party hand in universi-
ties and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) will 
restrict further development beyond the 
current stage of innovation.43 Private firms 
are leading the way on innovation, yet the 
state has propped up SOEs in recent years, 
backsliding on years of reform efforts. Inter-
national politics, especially the U.S.-China 
relationship, have also created significant 
barriers to market access. The United States 
is cracking down on Chinese tech-related 
investments, prohibiting firms like Huawei 
from selling into its market and others, 
drying up investment with new investment 
approval reforms, and threatening to cut off 
the supply of key components for firms like 
ZTE.44 These efforts by the Trump adminis-
tration could be extremely detrimental to 
Chinese firms and could prohibit techno-
logical learning and upgrading. In the long 
term, closed or restricted access to the U.S. 
market makes it very difficult for compa-
nies to become truly globally competitive 
and amass needed profits.45 An expanded, 
wealthier consumer base in China will help, 
but it is still nowhere near the prize of the 
U.S. market. Finally, China’s pure innova-
tion inputs—in human capital, the value of 
intellectual property, and applied research 
and development (R&D)—are still lagging. 
China has, to date, made up for these short-
comings with a focus on experimental R&D 
(80 percent of all R&D in China) and com-
mercialization. Reports indicate that they 
have been improving on these metrics in 
recent years.46 In order to push larger parts 
of the economy forward, China will have to 
continue this progress.
There are also two rather unique factors 
that will shape China’s innovation push. The 
first one, structural in nature, stems from 
the size of China’s economy. China’s mas-
sive manufacturing base and employment 
is without compare.47 It will be extremely 
difficult to fully propel all sectors and firms 
into a new model. The innovation-driven 
economies of the world are largely smaller, 
denser places, such as those in Europe 
and elsewhere in East Asia. The United 
States is the prime exception with its large, 
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innovation-based economy. But it too has 
grappled with its own issues of sector, 
firm, and employment shifts as a result of 
issues resulting from the transition away 
from manufacturing over the past decades 
(at least in part).48 The second issue con-
cerns the unique “China effect” on global 
innovation. China mobilizes overwhelm-
ing resources to support sector growth, as 
discussed, which can drive down margins 
and drive out the high-end firms that spend 
heavily on R&D to innovate. This was the 
case in the solar PV market, which suffered 
from Chinese-led overcapacity, and the 
worry is that it will happen again. “To put it 
plainly,” Scott Kennedy says, “China could 
do to semiconductors, artificial intelligence, 
and pharmaceuticals what it has done to 
steel and aluminum. This could, in turn, 
result in a downturn in overall productivity, 
the most important source of growth for 
countries and the global economy.”49 On 
this China effect, the future is less certain, 
but a larger shift away from innovation-led 
growth seems unlikely at this point. 
Conclusion
Innovation in China still suffers from some 
persistent shortcomings. That is true today 
and will likely be true in the foreseeable 
future. But, in returning to the original ques-
tion, this doesn’t mean that China won’t 
ultimately succeed in its overall economic 
transition. Chinese-style innovation is now 
rightly recognized as a powerful global 
force, as exemplified by the internet and 
renewable sector examples. The govern-
ment’s policies to realize its objectives are 
largely the right ones; incomparable financ-
ing and support buoy these policies. Finally, 
an ascendant private sector is poised to 
potentially leapfrog its competitors in 
the United States and other advanced 
economies in a meaningful way. These 
trends are too powerful to slow, mean-
ing the lasting challenges will only affect 
China’s transition at the margins—creat-
ing an innovation-driven economy, with 
Chinese characteristics.
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Introduction
On November 4, 2017, the Standing 
Committee of the 12th National People’s 
Congress formally adopted the first major 
revision to China’s Standardization Law, 
almost thirty years after China’s original 
Standardization Law was adopted in 1989.1 
Standardization reform has been a major 
priority for the Chinese government since 
the 18th National Party Congress in 2012, 
and the 2017 revision to China’s Standard-
ization Law is the culmination of a five-year 
process that began when the State Council 
published the Deepening Standardization 
Reform Scheme in 2012. According to 
remarks made by Premier Li Keqiang, this 
campaign was a direct result of the Party 
recognizing that “standardization is a reflec-
tion of a country’s core competitiveness 
and overall strength.”2 
Prior to the 2017 Standardization Law, 
the development of Chinese standards 
was largely centralized, with the majority 
of standards-setting power vested in the 
Standardization Administration of China 
(SAC). The Chinese government has recog-
nized that its standardization regime had to 
change as China’s economy became more 
globally integrated. The new law allows 
industries to band together and create vol-
untary enterprise standards which can then 
be transformed into national standards in 
cooperation with SAC, enhancing the role 
of the market in China’s standardization 
process.3 At the same time, leaders in 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
Chinese industry groups see the opportu-
nities inherent in China becoming a global 
standards leader and have an interest in 
controlling the broader direction of China’s 
standards development.4
This paper seeks to evaluate China’s recent 
efforts to promote Chinese standards glob-
ally and to assess the potential implications 
China’s emerging standardization strategy 
may hold for the role of standards in inter-
national trade. Following a discussion of 
existing frameworks commonly applied to 
standards development in China, this paper 
builds a new framework designed to evalu-
ate China’s standards development strategy 
in the context of its broader economic 
objectives. This framework characterizes 
China’s standards development strategy as 
a new type of comprehensive “standards 
push” involving three key elements: the 
integration of standards development and 
China’s broader industrial policy goals, Chi-
na’s increased participation in the making 
of international standards, and China’s 
efforts to link Chinese standards to the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This standards 
push framework is then used to assess the 
implications of China’s standardization 
reform for standards enforcement in the 
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WTO and international standards develop-
ment efforts in organizations such as the 
International Standards Organization (ISO). 
Ultimately, this paper finds that framing 
China’s standardization reform as part 
of a broader comprehensive standards 
push is a useful but limited approach for 
researching China’s standardization reform 
and evaluating its potential implications for 
the role of standards in the global trading 
system. Using this framework, this paper 
assesses that as long as it remains an 
integral component of China’s broader 
industrial policy, standardization reform 
in China is likely to pose a significant chal-
lenge to the norms governing the role of 
standards in international trade. 
Existing Frameworks for 
Explaining China’s  
Standardization Strategy
Standardization is an often overlooked ele-
ment of the global economic system that 
is nonetheless essential for its function. As 
countries make new breakthroughs in fields 
such as information and communications 
technology (ICT), pharmaceuticals, and 
manufacturing, widely adopted interna-
tional standards can ensure that products 
and services resulting from these break-
throughs can be easily traded and used 
across borders. The most successful interna-
tional standards are so widely adopted that 
they are taken as given by most consumers, 
such as the Universal Serial Bus (USB) in 
computing, or the YYYY–MM–DD standard 
for communicating dates and times.5 The 
popular consensus in international eco-
nomics literature is that companies able to 
set standards enjoy a first-mover advantage 
when developing any derivative technology 
that conforms to that standard. In addition 
to this first-mover advantage, standard-
ization facilitates the production of new 
goods by more unskilled labor, granting 
yet another first-mover advantage to com-
panies that develop technical standards.6 
Standards setters also typically receive 
rents (most commonly in the form of roy-
alties) for the rights to adopt the standards 
they set. Even ISO, the leading international 
organization governing standards develop-
ment, charges companies a nominal fee for 
the right to use standards developed by its 
technical committees, which are produced 
(at least nominally) “to be applied in the 
development of international regulation.”7
This first-mover incentive to develop new 
standards is not just limited to companies 
operating in innovative industries; this 
framework applies at the country level as 
well. Earlier work by contemporary experts 
on China’s standards development, such 
as that of Dieter Ernst or Scott Kennedy, 
focuses on how countries work to promote 
standards that are favorable to the major 
players in their domestic industries, a pro-
cess that often favors more developed 
economies such as the United States and 
Germany.8 Ernst in particular outlines the 
challenges faced by developing countries 
as they seek to catch up in the realm of 
standards development. Focusing primar-
ily on Asian economies, Ernst argues that 
latecomers must deal with a series of trade-
offs when deciding how to formulate future 
Standardization reform in China is likely to pose a 
significant challenge to the norms governing the role of 
standards in international trade.
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industrial policy in the face of well-estab-
lished technical standards.9 Of particular 
significance to China’s situation is the trade-
off Ernst identifies between timely access 
to advanced technologies and the ability 
to develop those technologies indige-
nously—operating within the bounds of 
established foreign technical standards 
enables faster development at the expense 
of continued technological dependence 
and vulnerability to rents generated by de 
facto industry standards. China’s approach 
to this dilemma has been to take what Ernst 
calls a “two-track approach”—incorporating 
Chinese technology into global standards 
in order to strengthen its bargaining power 
and reduce its payments of high royalty fees, 
while at the same time promoting its own 
new international standards in an effort to 
change the international standards system 
over time.10 China’s ultimate ambition is to 
transform its domestic industries into “stan-
dards makers” instead of “standards takers.” 
In China’s case, the struggle for dominance 
in the realm of technical standards occurs 
among existing “standards coalitions” as 
Scott Kennedy calls them—various indus-
try groups and government organizations 
that band together in order to promote 
the adoption of their own domestically 
conceived standards.11 Writing in 2006, 
Kennedy argued that standards coalitions 
in China were too weak to compete with 
foreign companies in the ICT sector, and 
Chinese efforts to promote an alternative 
standard for wireless internet connec-
tions, known as WAPI, ultimately lost out 
to foreign coalitions advocating Chinese 
adoption of the more widely used Wi-Fi 
standard.12 Kennedy’s assessment of Chi-
nese standards coalitions at the time was 
highly accurate: their slow and centralized 
nature combined with a lack of interna-
tional “lobbying” experience left them at 
a disadvantage when facing the more expe-
rienced U.S. companies that constituted the 
opposing standards coalition. However, 
despite their relative inability to advance 
the WAPI standard, Chinese standards coa-
litions continued to pursue its adoption at 
the international level. Chinese representa-
tives submitted WAPI to ISO for recognition 
as an international standard four years later 
in 2010, and while ISO ultimately rejected 
it, the case China made in 2010 was much 
more sophisticated and had broader inter-
national support than the case they made 
in 2006, indicating the progress Chinese 
standards coalitions were capable of 
making within four years.13 Chinese stan-
dards coalitions have since become an 
even stronger force on the international 
stage as a result of two complementary 
strategies: increasing participation in inter-
national standards-setting bodies such as 
ISO and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC), and developing edu-
cation initiatives and incentive programs 
designed to create a new generation of 
Chinese standardization experts. 
At the international level, Chinese efforts 
to become more involved in standardiza-
tion range from the mundane to the cutting 
edge. On one hand, it seems that Chinese 
experts are contributing to every interna-
tional standardization technical committee 
in which they can be involved. Right after 
the new Standardization Law was passed, 
the China National Institute of Standard-
ization (CNIS), one of several government 
bodies involved in standardization, ran a 
story on its web page featuring Chinese 
participation in an ISO meeting on safety 
signs. CNIS praised its experts who “sub-
mitted recommendations on safety signage 
including ‘Caution: Falling into Water’ and 
‘Beware: Jellyfish.’”14 On the other hand, 
Chinese experts are also participating in 
standards development groups in highly 
technical industries at a much higher rate. 
In March 2018, Chinese lawmakers began a 
national standards-setting process for new 
energy vehicle charging apparatuses, and 
the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) published a white paper 
on the standardization of blockchain tech-
nology.15 In 2013, CNIS began developing 
master’s degree programs in technology 
standardization with the goal of increas-
ing the ability of Chinese contributors to 
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promote China’s interests in international 
standards-setting bodies like ISO.16 
Both the China-as-latecomer framework 
and the standards coalition framework 
are useful for evaluating China’s standards 
development today. When discussing Chi-
na’s standards development push, Chinese 
policymakers and academics frequently 
cite a desire to regain a measure of control 
over China’s massive domestic technology 
market. In 2007, a leading official responsi-
ble for China’s technology policy claimed 
that “China’s market is one of the largest 
in the world, but the market is controlled 
by foreign companies, and the situation is 
extremely grave as we are further pressured 
by developed countries who use blockades 
and technology controls.”17 This sentiment 
is echoed across other national level eco-
nomic planning documents, with a phrase 
translated as “first-mover advantage” (先
发优势, xianfa youshi) appearing in sev-
eral State Council directives dealing with 
standardization.18 Regarding standards 
coalitions, the 2017 Standardization Law 
codifies a process of public-private coop-
eration that has long characterized the 
Chinese standards development process. 
The law calls upon the SAC to “encourage 
enterprises, social organizations, educational 
institutions, research institutes, and other 
organizations to participate in international 
standardization activities.”19 The law also 
focuses on developing an infrastructure to 
strengthen standards makers at every level 
of commerce and government, stating:
People’s governments at or above the 
county level shall support pilot and 
demonstration projects and publicity 
work concerning standardization, dis-
seminate standardization concepts, 
spread standardization experiences, 
promote the use of standardization 
methods throughout society for organiz-
ing production, business, management 
and services, and make the most of the 
supporting role of standards for encour-
aging industrial transformation and 
upgrading and driving innovation.20
Taken together with programs like the CNIS 
master’s program in technical standards, 
the law seems especially concerned with 
strengthening China’s standards coalitions 
at every level by directing SAC to foster a 
culture of standards development within 
industry and enterprise associations. The 
push to strengthen standards coalitions in 
China is seeing strong results: In a 2013 
research report for the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission, 
Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree claim 
that Chinese standards experts “now have 
a much better understanding of the spe-
cific wording of international agreements 
about standards, to include what practices 
are allowed, when, and how.”21 In their 
report, Breznitz and Murphree posit that 
China “may now have an advantage over 
the U.S. (and U.S. firms) in international 
and domestic standards bodies because 
of their understanding of the law and the 
system that governs it.”22 In most standard-
ization disputes, the winning side is most 
often the one that understands the system 
in which they operate.23  
Standards and  
Indigenous Innovation
Meanwhile, the domestic push for the 
development of new standards has been 
linked to China’s push for indigenous 
innovation in advanced manufacturing 
and information technology, as exempli-
fied by initiatives such as Made in China 
2025. In concert with the 13th Five-Year 
Plan (2016–2020), Made in China 2025 
seeks to transform China’s economy into 
a “quality driven economy” that is less reli-
ant on foreign technology imports and is 
able to export its own technically advanced 
products by 2025.24 In order to achieve this 
goal, the State Council has begun provid-
ing financial support to priority industries, 
funding foreign technology acquisitions, 
and positioning state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to become “global champions” in 
each named industry sector.25 Standards 
are an essential component of China’s push 
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to create global champions; a saying that 
has become popular recently among Chi-
nese scholars of innovation is “third-tier 
companies make products, second-tier 
companies make technology, and first-tier 
companies make standards (三流企业做产
品, sanliu qiye zuochanpin; 二流企业做技
术, erliu qiye zuo jishu; 一流企业做标准, yiliu 
qiye zuo bioazhun).”26
The standardization reform proposed so 
far in conjunction with the Made in China 
2025 initiative has provoked concern in 
China’s major Western trading partners. In 
its 2017 report to Congress on China’s WTO 
compliance, the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) says that Chi-
na’s “ongoing effort to develop unique 
national standards aims eventually to serve 
the interests of Chinese companies while 
simultaneously seeking to impede and dis-
advantage their foreign counterparts.”27 
The American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) and the United States Information 
Technology Office (USITO) submitted com-
ments on China’s 2017 Standardization Law 
during its drafting process, pointing out 
that the law emphasized the “development 
and promotion of Chinese standards with 
no indication of intent to give preference to 
international standards.”28 Concern about 
the potential market impacts of Chinese 
standardization reform has not been limited 
to the United States—the Deutsches Institut 
für Normung (DIN), which cooperated with 
SAC in 2011 to form the German-Chinese 
Standardization Cooperation Commis-
sion, raised similar concerns, particularly 
about China’s perceived lack of defer-
ence to already established international 
standards during the drafting process of 
its 2017 Standardization Law.29 In contrast 
to the adversarial approach that U.S. stan-
dards makers and the U.S. government 
have taken to China’s push for standards 
development, DIN has a longstanding 
cooperative relationship with Chinese stan-
dards organizations; this lends significance 
to the similarity between their comments 
about China’s Standardization Law and the 
comments made by ANSI, USITO, and the 
U.S. government. 
Standards Push: Industrial 
Policy, ISO Participation, and 
the Belt and Road Initiative
An increased ability to compete in inter-
national standards bodies does not 
necessarily mean Chinese standards 
makers are going to promote unique 
Chinese standards solely for the sake of 
competing with U.S. and European stan-
dards makers. Kennedy, Suttmeier, and Su 
in 2008 made a convincing case for the 
majority of new Chinese standards being 
non-controversial. Kennedy et. al found that 
the only controversial standards initiatives 
undertaken by China at that time were all in 
the ICT sector, with other standards being 
seen largely as China’s efforts to “catch 
up to the developed world.”30 However, 
much has changed in the ten years since 
this research was published. China has 
drastically increased its representation in 
international standards-setting bodies that 
lead in developing technical standards 
for developed countries. For example, 
in 2008, fewer than 100 Chinese experts 
Indigenous innovation as outlined in the 15-Year Plan  
involves a dual-track strategy of encouraging Chinese 
firms to file more patents and propose more domestic 
 and international standards.
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participated in the standards-setting meet-
ings of the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC), the leading international 
standards-setting organization for all major 
ICT and electronics sectors.31 
In order to determine how China’s stan-
dardization strategy might evolve in the 
wake of these changes, this paper analyzes 
three elements of China’s standardization 
strategy and discusses their implications: 
the role of standards development in 
China’s industrial policy, the nature of 
China’s increased participation in ISO 
standards-setting, and China’s plans to inte-
grate its standardization processes with the 
Belt and Road Initiative.  
Industrial Policy
To clarify the role of standards develop-
ment in China’s broader industrial policy, 
this paper focuses on analyzing specific 
State Council directives and planning doc-
uments connected to the 13th Five-Year 
Plan, which outlines the party’s economic 
priorities from 2016 to 2020. This approach 
was chosen due to the lack of case stud-
ies available about China’s post-reform 
standardization processes, and because 
of the unique function of Five-Year Plans 
in China’s economy. China’s national stan-
dardization strategy is still emerging, and 
there are few viable ways of determining its 
role in specific sectors through case stud-
ies or other post facto methods of analysis. 
The 13th Five-Year Plan outlines incentives, 
funding schemes, and central government 
expectations of firms operating in priority 
sectors such as ICT, the automobile indus-
try, and biopharmaceuticals. Furthermore, 
China’s Five-Year Plans influence economic 
behavior by directing funding to certain 
firms, provinces, and cities that contribute 
to meeting goals outlined in the national 
Five-Year Plan. The dual pressures of 
meeting the State Council’s expectations 
and acquiring access to central funding 
before their competitors drives most firms 
and local governments to adopt the State 
Council’s priorities as their own, which 
results in most Five-Year Plans broadly 
meeting their stated objectives.32 
The 13th Five-Year Plan was first announced 
in 2016, but the policy ideas that consti-
tute its foundation can be traced back to a 
State Council document published in 2006, 
The National Medium- and Long-Term Sci-
ence and Technology Development Plan, 
which was styled as a 15-Year Plan outlin-
ing priorities for national technological 
development from 2006 to 2020. This 
15-Year Plan established a new principle, 
“indigenous innovation” (自主创新, zizhu 
chuangxin), which would become the guid-
ing principle of standards development in 
the 13th Five-Year Plan, published ten years 
later.33 Indigenous innovation as outlined 
in the 15-Year Plan involves a dual-track 
strategy of encouraging Chinese firms 
to file more patents and propose more 
domestic and international standards. 
On both counts, the push for indigenous 
innovation appears to have been wildly 
successful; China’s State Intellectual Prop-
erty Office (SIPO) is now the busiest in the 
world, with 928,177 applications received 
in 2014, 86.3 percent of which came from 
domestic applicants. In the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office, Chinese patent 
applications in ICT alone increased over 
1,000 percent from 2008–2018.34 
Priority sectors outlined in Made in China 
2025 are at the forefront of this push to 
indigenize, and several planning docu-
ments at the national, provincial, and local 
levels provide insight into how Chinese 
policymakers see indigenous innovation 
and standardization as complementary. 
In May 2015, the State Council published 
Several Opinions on Accelerating the 
Cultivation of New Competitive Edges in 
Foreign Trade.35 Not only does the term 
“indigenous innovation” appear alongside 
“standards” nine times in the document, 
but it also outlines plans to “encourage the 
propagation of Chinese standards.”36 Given 
the document’s explicitly stated purpose of 
“cultivating a competitive edge in foreign 
trade,” the motivation behind the proposed 
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propagation of Chinese standards appears 
to be somewhat competitively driven. 
This competitive drive is even more pro-
nounced in the ICT sector. The National 
Informationization Development Strategy, 
published by the CPC Central Committee 
and the State Council in July 2016, not 
only contains several paired references of 
“indigenous innovation” and “standard-
ization,” but these passages have also 
been flagged as “explicitly problematic” 
by several foreign companies.37 One pas-
sage calls for standardization to be part of 
a “comprehensive multilevel protection 
scheme” for China’s ICT industry. While the 
plan is largely hortatory and aspirational in 
nature, with very few specific policy pre-
scriptions, a recent report by the European 
Commission of the Directorate-General 
for Trade indicated that standards-setting is 
also appearing alongside calls for protecting 
new industries at the provincial level.38 For 
example, in Guangdong Province’s Action 
Plan for the Year 2014-2015 on Building a 
Powerful Province With Quality, a section 
titled “Strengthen Standardization Work” 
begins with, “we shall focus on areas of 
strategic emerging industries such as 
areas of high-end new electronic infor-
mation ... and promote the establishment 
of advanced standards with indigenous 
intellectual property rights.”39 Apart from 
Guangdong’s provincial level plans, sim-
ilar language can be found in ICT sector 
development plans in Zhejiang and Fujian, 
with the phrase “advanced standards with 
indigenous intellectual property rights” 
appearing even at the municipal level in plans 
specific to Shanghai, Ningbo, and Xiamen.40
Outside the ICT sector, standardization 
is connected to localization most often 
in plans related to the automobile indus-
try. The Energy-Saving and New-Energy 
Automotive Industry Development Plan 
(2012-2020), published by the State Coun-
cil, identifies “expediting the formation of 
technology, standards, and brands using 
indigenous intellectual property” as a 
“basic principle.”41 Overall, the presence 
of this language across a broad spectrum 
of plans points heavily to a broader move 
towards localization, in which standards 
play a significant role. 
ISO Participation 
In conjunction with its efforts to use stan-
dards as a mechanism for reforming its 
domestic industrial policy, China is also 
pursuing an international leadership role in 
standards development through increased 
participation in ISO’s standards develop-
ment process. ISO centers its standards 
development process on technical com-
mittees composed of industry experts from 
various countries. ISO publishes standards, 
but it does not autonomously create them; 
rather, ISO serves as a kind of arena in which 
different countries and standards coalitions 
lobby for their own domestically conceived 
standards.42 Getting a standard ratified and 
promulgated by ISO is beneficial for coun-
tries and standards coalitions in two ways. 
First, it bestows the standards maker with 
the previously discussed first-mover advan-
tage, as global producers overwhelmingly 
subscribe to ISO standards, particularly in 
high-tech industries like ICT. Second, ISO 
ratification carries an implicit recognition of 
China’s decision to sign a group of bilateral standards 
agreements at the ISO meeting ... indicates that China is 
pursuing a parallel strategy of promoting its standards 
alongside increased participation in ISO.
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the standards maker’s technical expertise, 
and signals that they have an influence on 
the market that operates on a level above 
that of pure market share. In China’s case, 
ISO standardization also signals to domes-
tic Chinese consumers that the overall 
quality of Chinese goods is increasing, to 
the point that Chinese goods can be used 
as an international benchmark.43  
China was a participating member in 706 
ISO technical committees in 2012. ISO’s 
most recent membership information lists 
China as a participating member in 730 
technical committees, which is a significant 
increase. For reference, Germany, widely 
considered to be ISO’s most active Western 
member country, went from participating in 
715 technical committees to 724 in the same 
time period.44 China’s increased represen-
tation in technical committees indicates 
that Chinese policymakers and industries 
see value in ISO participation. Chinese 
policymakers have not only increased their 
representation in ISO technical committees 
but now also have companies and experts 
chairing them. Huawei currently chairs an 
ISO Joint Technical Committee on AI Stan-
dardization (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42).45 This 
particular committee includes premier U.S. 
ICT standardization organizations, includ-
ing USITO and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). Buy-in 
from these organizations into Huwaei’s 
ISO committee is a significant indicator 
of China’s progress towards its goal of 
becoming a standards maker. 
Apart from its participation in ISO standard-
ization processes, China is also pursuing 
a broader leadership role in the organiza-
tion. In September 2016, Beijing hosted 
the 39th ISO General Assembly, and the 
Chinese government was determined to 
display enthusiasm for international stan-
dardization during the meeting while also 
outlining its vision for China’s future role 
in standards development. Zhang Xiao-
gang, a Chinese steel magnate, serving as 
ISO’s president during the Beijing General 
Assembly, used his remarks to point out 
that, despite its push to lead in international 
standardization, China “only led in 0.7 per-
cent of international standards, and needs 
intensified participation in the formulation 
of international standards.”46 
During the meeting, China signed several 
agreements with the European Com-
mittee for Standardization, outlining a 
framework for mutual recognition of 
standards and “exchanges of personnel 
and information.”47 Studies have shown 
China has a history of using multilateral 
organization meetings as a forum for 
signing separate bilateral agreements 
with other participants, often to support 
its own international objectives that are 
outside the parameters of, but broadly in 
line with, the spirit of the international orga-
nization convening the meeting.48 China’s 
decision to sign a group of bilateral stan-
dards agreements at the ISO meeting, 
discussed below, indicates that China is 
pursuing a parallel strategy of promoting 
its standards alongside increased partic-
ipation in ISO. 
Standards and the Belt and 
Road Initiative 
During the 2016 ISO General Assembly 
in Beijing, China also signed bilateral 
standards agreements with nine other 
countries, including Albania, Russia, and 
Turkey. Chinese press reports regarding 
these bilateral standards agreements all 
emphasized their role in BRI.49 Apart from 
its various other roles in China’s interna-
tional economic engagement strategy, BRI 
is seen by Chinese policymakers as a premier 
opportunity to “export Chinese standards 
while upgrading Chinese industry”—lan-
guage that echoes its domestic industrial 
policies.50 Alongside its publication of guide-
lines governing standardization, the State 
Council has also produced two standards 
development plans specifically related to 
BRI, the Action Plan to Connect “One Belt, 
One Road” Through Standardization (2015–
2017), and the Action Plan on Belt and 
Road Standard Connectivity (2018–2020). 
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While the 2018–2020 plan is more up to 
date on current events and accounts for 
political changes that have occurred in 
focus countries, the two plans are similar 
and provide insight into the parallel inter-
national standardization framework China 
is pursuing, apart from its involvement 
in ISO. Both plans exhort Chinese stan-
dards makers to facilitate the “going out” 
of Chinese standards and outline several 
strategies for accomplishing this goal. For 
example, the 2015–2017 plan calls for “con-
ducting comparative analysis of standards 
in bulk import/export sectors across One 
Belt One Road countries,” and the subse-
quent promotion of Chinese standards if 
the countries in question have not already 
adopted ISO standards.51 The 2015–2017 
plan also proposes tying BRI funding to the 
broader adoption of Chinese standards in 
countries hosting BRI projects, which may 
serve as a mechanism to entice these coun-
tries to adopt Chinese standards.52 The 
2018–2020 plan goes even further, calling 
on Chinese standards experts to “establish 
a preliminary ‘standardization think tank’ 
to conduct research on the standardization 
laws, regulations, systems, and develop-
ment strategies of BRI countries in order 
to push for early outcomes.”53 
Furthermore, the 2018–2020 plan offers 
some insight into how China plans to use 
BRI as a means to increase its influence in 
ISO. The plan proposes allocating funding 
for the establishment of “standardization 
centers” in BRI countries to “train local stan-
dards experts and support standardization 
capacity-building in BRI countries, so as 
to enhance Chinese standards’ influence 
overseas.”54 In coordination with building 
the standardization capacity of BRI coun-
tries, a separate subsection of the plan 
proposes working with these countries to 
“push the ISO to establish new technical 
institutions in the fields which have signifi-
cant impacts on the industries of the BRI.”55 
This seems to indicate that if the Belt and 
Road initiative moves forward according to 
plan, Chinese-led standardization efforts in 
ISO will receive the support of standards 
experts from other countries involved 
in BRI. Chinese standards will also likely 
become more prevalent as countries in 
Africa, Europe, and the Middle East are 
incentivized to adopt them if they choose 
to become more involved in BRI projects 
in the future. 
Implications of China’s  
Standards Push for the  
International Trading System   
The foundations of China’s emerging 
comprehensive standardization strategy 
have the potential to significantly affect 
the rules and norms governing the role of 
standards in international trade. It is outside 
the scope of this paper to predict the con-
crete effects that China’s standards push 
will have on international trade using trade 
data. Changes in imports and exports are 
notoriously difficult to attribute to standards 
empirically; the few studies that have man-
aged to do so focus on the diffusion of a 
single standard across multiple countries 
and rely on relatively advanced econo-
metrics techniques.56 There is currently 
little data available that would support an 
attempt to model the effect of standard-
ization on China’s economic behavior, as 
China’s standards strategy is still emerging. 
However, there are still methods to quali-
tatively assess the potential implications of 
China’s standards push on the norms gov-
erning standards and international trade. 
One method of evaluating these impli-
cations involves examining the drafting 
process of the 2017 Standardization Law 
and its reactivity to input from international 
standards makers. While international 
institutions such as ISO and IEC publish 
standards, they do not impose any legal 
obligations on their member countries that 
dictate how standards are used. Powerful 
international standards leaders including 
ANSI, the European Committee for Stan-
dardization (ECS), and DIN set de facto 
standards of best practice that most other 
standardization organizations generally 
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follow, but they have no enforcement power 
that can compel countries to adopt inter-
nationally accepted standards.57 That 
power effectively rests with the WTO. 
When SAC and the National People’s 
Congress began drafting the new Stan-
dardization Law, they solicited public 
comments from international standards 
makers and industry associations. ANSI, 
ECS, and DIN all submitted comments 
that shared one common point of con-
cern—China’s draft Standardization Law 
contained no clause signifying intent to 
adhere to the WTO’s 1997 agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which 
is the closest approximation the world 
has to an enforceable global normative 
framework governing standardization.58 
The WTO TBT agreement stipulates that 
“where technical regulations are required 
and relevant international standards exist 
or their completion is imminent, members 
shall use them, or the relevant parts of 
them, as a basis for their technical regula-
tions.”59 Effectively, the TBT agreement 
requires WTO member countries to use 
internationally accepted standards or 
risk retaliatory action through the WTO’s 
arbitration apparatus. ISO, ANSI, and 
ECS all use the WTO TBT Agreement as 
a reference for how their standards are 
internationally applicable.60 
During the drafting process, comments 
submitted by the US-China Business Coun-
cil (USCBC) reveal that SAC scaled back the 
role of international standards while draft-
ing the Standardization Law. According to 
USCBC, “the draft law deleted language 
promoting the adoption of international 
standards; the draft law also adds language 
placing conditions on the adoption of inter-
national standards.”61 Despite input from 
these influential standards and trade orga-
nizations calling on SAC to include language 
that supports the existing standards and 
trade governance, the final version of the 
Standardization Law only includes a single 
clause obligating standards makers in China 
to support “the adoption of international 
standards in the Chinese context.”62 The only 
other related language in the Standardization 
Law calls for increased participation in interna-
tional standardization activities, a priority that is 
reflected in China’s increased participation in 
ISO meetings and committees.63
Using the standards push framework pro-
posed by this paper to evaluate SAC’s 
failure to integrate language support-
ing international standards (outside of a 
Chinese context) into the new Standard-
ization Law has potential implications 
for international standardization and 
trade. The first potential implication is 
that China could indeed be preparing 
to use its growing list of unique national 
standards as technical barriers to trade to 
protect industries essential to its indus-
trial policy. As foreign companies seek to 
enter China’s market, they may begin to 
face standardization measures that limit 
their ability to compete with domestic 
manufacturers. One area where this may 
already be occurring is the automobile 
industry. The recent Section 301 inves-
tigation conducted by USTR identifies 
several standardization measures in the 
automobile industry that increase local 
content requirements, require increased 
compliance testing for foreign cars enter-
ing the market, and push foreign auto 
manufacturers to turn over certain 
elements of their intellectual property 
during certification processes.64 The 
report also notes standards in cyber-
security and biopharmaceuticals that 
“drastically exceed the burden and 
scope of international standards.”65 
USTR’s finding that these standards are 
designed to advance China’s industrial 
policy goals are supported by the frame-
work developed by this paper. Each of 
these areas is a priority sector linked to 
Made in China 2025, and as the documents 
analyzed in this paper establish, standard-
ization is an essential part of advancing 
China’s overall industrial policy goals. As 
China continues to push for the adoption of 
its own unique standards, both domestically 
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and internationally, particularly along BRI, for-
eign companies looking to access China’s 
market or become involved in BRI projects 
are likely to face conformity with evolving 
Chinese standards as a barrier to entry. 
The second and more far-reaching implica-
tion is that China is developing a network 
of standards designed to eventually 
supplant widely used international stan-
dards. Despite the Standardization Law’s 
encouragement of stakeholder participa-
tion in standardization activities, Western 
standards experts and industry associa-
tions appear to be increasingly shut out 
of technical committees (TCs) that make 
standards in China. The European Cham-
ber of Commerce in China has noted that 
European and U.S. businesses are afforded 
little to no opportunity to participate in Chi-
nese standards-setting. The report notes 
that “foreign-invested enterprises are 
sometimes only granted observer status 
in TCs, or even excluded from member-
ship altogether.”66 The report also points 
out that Chinese standards relating to data 
security and cloud computing do not align 
at all with international standards such as 
the EU’s proposed General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR).67 If Chinese data 
protection standards and the GDPR end 
up competing, China’s growing standards 
expertise and support for Chinese stan-
dards in international projects like those 
involved in BRI could provide Chinese data 
protection standards with an advantage. 
As China continues to prioritize participa-
tion in ISO, its efforts to minimize foreign 
stakeholder input in its own standardization 
processes, combined with its use of ISO 
meetings to sign separate bilateral stan-
dards agreements, could also be seen as 
an effort to increase its role in ISO at the 
expense of Western standards makers. This 
possibility is supported by China’s plans to 
invest in “standardization capacity build-
ing”68 in countries involved in BRI, many of 
whom are also members of ISO. Increasing 
the number of Chinese-trained standards 
makers in ISO, including those coming from 
BRI countries trained by Chinese standards 
experts, will also likely increase the influence 
of Chinese standards in international trade. 
Suggestions for Future 
Research and Conclusion 
China is likely to continue to increase its 
involvement in international standardiza-
tion and propose its own unique standards 
in new areas and in areas where inter-
national standards are already widely 
adopted. Framing this behavior in the 
context of a broader standards push linked 
to Chinese industrial policy could help 
guide future research on China’s standards 
development. Currently, the utility of the 
standards push framework for evaluating 
China’s standardization strategy in detail 
is relatively limited. However, it provides a 
useful starting point for evaluating future 
actions by China in the international stan-
dards-setting community. For example, 
if China continues to sign more bilateral 
standards cooperation agreements, this 
framework could prove useful for placing 
each bilateral agreement in the con-
text of China’s broader standardization 
Foreign companies looking to access China’s market  
or become involved in BRI projects are likely to face 
conformity with evolving Chinese standards  
as a barrier to entry.







 vol 5  | 2019
strategy. The standards push framework 
proposed by this paper will also be useful 
in measuring the progress China makes 
towards its standardization goals in the 
time between the current 13th Five-Year 
Plan and its future iterations. 
Additionally, each of the three elements of 
the standards push framework proposed by 
this paper could be further explored. The 
tranche of Five-Year Plans, State Council 
directives, and guiding opinions analyzed 
in this paper are a small sample of hun-
dreds of industrial policy documents. If 
other documents connected to China’s 
industrial policy and the 13th Five-Year Plan 
are analyzed for similar language, a data set 
could be built that allows for the identifica-
tion of broader trends in China’s domestic 
standardization processes. Using this data 
set to track which provinces, municipalities, 
and industry sectors implement the largest 
number of new standardization measures 
could be useful for investigating the role 
of standards in China’s political economy. 
Finally, as China invests in improving its own 
standardization expertise and the standard-
ization expertise in countries involved in 
BRI, tracking the participation of standards 
experts from these countries in ISO technical 
committees over time could help deter-
mine the efficacy of those investments. 
As new frontiers for technical standards 
such as 5G telecommunications, AI, and 
cloud computing continue to open up in 
the future, we will likely see China push for 
an even greater leadership role for itself 
and its standards in the global economy. 
Unfortunately, the new Standardization Law 
is unlikely to contribute to the alignment of 
international standards and Chinese stan-
dards as much as other standards-setting 
organizations hoped it would. In fact, the 
new law’s emphasis on increased Chinese 
participation in the setting and adoption 
of international standards in the Chinese 
context imply an intent to keep Chinese 
standards and international standards at 
least partially at odds. As long as standard-
ization remains an integral component of 
China’s broader industrial policy, standard-
ization reform in China is unlikely to bring 
Chinese and international standards into 
further alignment in the foreseeable future. 
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